Write a short note on the power sharing in J&K legislative council according to the constitution

In the constitution of jammu and kashmir,we find the provisions dealing with power sharing,in view of the nature of the state being composed of three distinct geographical regions with internal social diversity.The constitution ensures representation of each region in the legeslative council.The power is shared equally between each region of Jammu and Kashmir.

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In the constitution of J&k we find the provisions dealing with the power sharing in view of nature of state J&k being composed of three distinct geographical regions with internal social diversity. article 50 of the state constitution says that the Legislative Council shall consist of 36 members.out of these 11 have to be necessary from Kashmir including one each from Ladakh and kargil. similarly 11 also be elected from Jammu region with one each from doda and punch.two members are elected by the member of urban local self body. 4 members are elected from the member of panchayats and other local cell bodies two each in the province of Jammu and Kashmir 8 members are nominated by the Governor amongest persons belonging socially and educationally backward classes in the state or person having contributited in the field of literature science art etc

Power sharing is a practice in conflict resolution where multiple groups distribute political, military, or economic power among themselves according to agreed rules.[1] It can refer to any formal framework or informal pact that regulates the distribution of power between divided communities.[2] Since the end of the Cold War, power-sharing systems have become increasingly commonplace in negotiating settlements for armed conflict.[3] Two common theoretical approaches to power sharing are consociationalism and centripetalism.

Broadly, power-sharing agreements contain provisions relating to at least one of the following: Political, economic, military, or territorial control.[1]

Political power-sharing involves rules governing the distribution of political offices and the exercise of decision-making powers. Power may be shared by guaranteeing the inclusion of all significant parties simultaneously in the governing cabinet through rules on grand coalition formation.[4] Alternatively, it may involve sharing power by guaranteeing sequential access to political office, like a rotating premiership.[2]: 18 Electoral systems can provide power-sharing through political proportionality, which better allows for minority groups to remain competitive and win a portion of political power through democratic elections.[5]

Proportionality also informs economic power-sharing, as the distribution of public resources may be instituted respective to the size of communities.[4]: 320 In neopatrimonial systems, political office may also be closely related to economic opportunity, meaning an equitable distribution of political power overlaps with economic power-sharing.[6]

Power-sharing theories make empirical and normative claims about the utility or desirability of power-sharing systems for conflict management in divided societies. Two salient power-sharing theories, which stake competing claims, are consociationalism and centripetalism. Empirically, each theory prescribes different systems for power-sharing, such as consociationalism's proportional voting compared to centripetalism's alternative vote.

Consociationalism

Consociationalism is a form of democratic power sharing.[7] Political scientists define a consociational state as one which has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group, but which remains stable due to consultation among the elites of these groups. Consociational states are often contrasted with states with majoritarian electoral systems.

The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy, and the avoidance of violence. In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stages. Supporters of the consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than integrationist approaches to conflict management.[8]

Centripetalism

Centripetalism, sometimes called integrationism, is a form of democratic power sharing for divided societies (usually along ethnic, religious or social lines) which aims to encourage the parties towards moderate and compromising policies and to reinforce the centre of the divided political spectrum. As a theory, centripetalism developed out of the criticism of consociationalism by Donald L.Horowitz. Both models aim to provide institutional prescriptions for divided societies. While consociationalism aims to give inclusion and representation to each ethnic group, centripetalism aims to depoliticize ethnicity and to encourage the establishment of multi-ethnic parties.[9]

Early modern examples of power sharing include the Peace of Augsburg and Peace of Westphalia.[10] The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland[11] is one of the famous examples of power sharing.

Early examples of consociational power sharing include the Netherlands (1917–1967), Belgium since 1918, and Lebanon since 1943.[12]

Examples of centripetal power sharing include Fiji (1997–2006), Northern Ireland (June 1973 – May 1974), Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka,[9] Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria.[13]

Comparative politics
Peace and conflict studies

^ a b Hartzell, Caroline A.; Hoddie, Matthew (2007). Crafting peace: power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars. University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press. p. 14. ISBN 978-0-271-05474-2.
^ a b McCulloch, Allison; McGarry, John (2017). Power-sharing : empirical and normative challenges. London. pp. 2–3. ISBN 9780367173784.
^ Taylor, Rupert (2009). Consociational theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland conflict. London: Routledge. p. 7. ISBN 9780415666015.
^ a b Hartzell, Caroline; Hoddie, Matthew (2003). "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management". American Journal of Political Science. 47 (2): 318–332. doi:10.2307/3186141.
^ Lijphart, Arend (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven. pp. 38–41. ISBN 978-0-300-15818-2.
^ Spears, Ian S. (March 2013). "Africa's Informal Power-Sharing and the Prospects for Peace". Civil Wars. 15 (1): 37–53. doi:10.1080/13698249.2013.781302.
^ O'Leary, Brendan (2005). "Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments". In Noel, Sid JR (ed.). From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press. pp. 3–43. ISBN 0-7735-2948-9.
^ McGarry, John; O'Leary, Brendan (2006). "Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's conflict, and its agreement 2: What critics of consociation can learn from Northern Ireland". Government and Opposition. 41 (2): 249–77. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00178.x.
^ a b Reilly, Benjamin (June 2012). "Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Communalism Compared". European Political Science. 11 (2): 259–270. doi:10.1057/eps.2011.36. ISSN 1680-4333.
^ Lehmbruch, Gerhard (1975). "Consociational Democracy in the International System". European Journal of Political Research (3): 377–391.
^ O'Leary, Brendan (2001). "The character of the 1998 Agreement: Results and prospects". In Wilford, Rick (ed.). Aspects of the Belfast Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 49–83. ISBN 0-19-924262-3.
^ McGarry, John (December 2019). "Classical Consociational Theory and Recent Consociational Performance". Swiss Political Science Review. 25 (4): 538–555. doi:10.1111/spsr.12378.
^ Coakley, John; Fraenkel, Jon (June 2014). "Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland". Political Science. 66 (1): 23–45. doi:10.1177/0032318714531979. ISSN 0032-3187.