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One of the most brutal conflicts in recent history, World War II devastated 113 countries from six continents. Beginning in 1939, the Allied forces — primarily Britain, Russia and the USA — sought to stop Nazi Germany in its conquest for European domination. In the six years that followed, Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party devastated Europe and wreaked violence against many social minority groups. By 1945, Western Europe had been ravaged, an entire race of people had come close to extinction and the dynamic of power in several affected countries had been forever changed. Hitler committed suicide in May 1945, and the Nazi regime collapsed. Japan surrendered in August. Even after peace was declared, the world felt the political and economic repercussions for decades. Following the war, a defeated Germany was divided into four sections, each of which was to be occupied by one of the Allied Powers. The Soviet Union took control of the eastern part of Germany, while France, Great Britain and the United States took control of the western part. The German capital of Berlin was also divided into four sections, even though Berlin itself was in the middle of the Soviet-controlled part of Germany. Although they had been allies during the war, the United States and the Soviet Union clashed philosophically on many issues. The superpowers disagreed about how to rebuild Germany, and tensions quickly rose, resulting in what later came to be known as the Cold War. Fearing that the Soviets would try to extend their communist philosophy to other countries, the United States adopted a policy of “containment,” which involved rebuilding war-torn Europe and promoting democracies to halt the spread of communism. In March 1948, Britain, France and the United States decided to combine their sections of Berlin into one unified West Berlin, angering the Soviets further. In June 1948 the Soviet Union, whose territory fully surrounded the capital, cut off all ground traffic into and out of West Berlin in an attempt to force the Allies to abandon the city. The blockade of Berlin had begun. President Truman suddenly faced a crisis. The citizens of West Berlin were quickly running out of food, supplies and time. Truman’s advisors suggested several options. They could evacuate the citizens of West Berlin, try to negotiate with the Soviet Union with the support of the newly-formed United Nations, figure out a way to get supplies into the city or simply abandon Berlin altogether. Their decision would determine exactly how involved the United States would be in Berlin - and in rebuilding post-war Europe. Ultimately, Truman determined that it was of utmost importance that the United States remain a presence in Berlin. He and the remaining Allies began the Berlin Airlift, an operation that carried food, fuel and other supplies into West Berlin by plane. The effort required a lot of careful planning and many resources, but the Airlift allowed the United States to keep a foothold in post-war Germany.
Was the Berlin Airlift the best option to address the Berlin Blockade, or would a different option have better served the USA’s interests?
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George F. Kennan, a career Foreign Service Officer, formulated the policy of “containment,” the basic United States strategy for fighting the cold war (1947–1989) with the Soviet Union. Kennan’s ideas, which became the basis of the Truman administration’s foreign policy, first came to public attention in 1947 in the form of an anonymous contribution to the journal Foreign Affairs, the so-called “X-Article.” “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union,” Kennan wrote, “must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” To that end, he called for countering “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world” through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would “promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” Kennan’s policy was controversial from the very beginning. Columnist Walter Lippmann attacked the X-Article for failing to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests. The United States, Kennan’s article implied, should face down the Soviet Union and its Communist allies whenever and wherever they posed a risk of gaining influence. In fact, Kennan advocated defending above all else the world’s major centers of industrial power against Soviet expansion: Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Others criticized Kennan’s policy for being too defensive. Most notably, John Foster Dulles declared during the 1952 election campaign that the United States’ policy should not be containment, but the “rollback” of Soviet power and the eventual “liberation” of Eastern Europe. Even within the Truman administration there was a rift over containment between Kennan and Paul Nitze, Kennan’s successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff. Nitze, who saw the Soviet threat primarily in military terms, interpreted Kennan’s call for “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force” to mean the use of military power. In contrast, Kennan, who considered the Soviet threat to be primarily political, advocated above all else economic assistance (e.g., the Marshall Plan) and “psychological warfare” (overt propaganda and covert operations) to counter the spread of Soviet influence. In 1950, Nitze’s conception of containment won out over Kennan’s. NSC 68, a policy document prepared by the National Security Council and signed by Truman, called for a drastic expansion of the U.S. military budget. The paper also expanded containment’s scope beyond the defense of major centers of industrial power to encompass the entire world. “In the context of the present polarization of power,” it read, “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” Despite all the criticisms and the various policy defeats that Kennan suffered in the early 1950’s, containment in the more general sense of blocking the expansion of Soviet influence remained the basic strategy of the United States throughout the cold war. On the one hand, the United States did not withdraw into isolationism; on the other, it did not move to “roll back” Soviet power, as John Foster Dulles briefly advocated. It is possible to say that each succeeding administration after Truman’s, until the collapse of communism in 1989, adopted a variation of Kennan’s containment policy and made it their own.  Containment was a geopolitical strategic foreign policy pursued by the United States during the Cold War to prevent the spread of communism after the end of World War II. The name was loosely related to the term cordon sanitaire, which was containment of the Soviet Union in the Interbellum period. As a component of the Cold War, this policy caused a response from the Soviet Union to increase communist influence in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Containment represented a middle-ground position between détente (relaxation of relations) and rollback (actively replacing a regime). The basis of the doctrine was articulated in a 1946 cable by US diplomat George F. Kennan during the post-World War II term of US President Harry S. Truman. As a description of US foreign policy, the word originated in a report Kennan submitted to US Defense Secretary James Forrestal in 1947, which was later used in a magazine article. Earlier uses of termThere were major historical precedents familiar to Americans and Europeans. In the 1850s, anti-slavery forces in the United States developed a free soil strategy of containment to stop the expansion of slavery until it later collapsed. Historian James Oakes explains the strategy:
Between 1873 and 1877, Germany repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of France's neighbors. In Belgium, Spain, and Italy, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck exerted strong and sustained political pressure to support the election or appointment of liberal, anticlerical governments. That was part of an integrated strategy to promote republicanism in France by strategically and ideologically isolating the clerical-monarchist regime of President Patrice de MacMahon. It was hoped that by surrounding France with a number of liberal states, French republicans could defeat MacMahon and his reactionary supporters. The modern concept of containment provides a useful model for understanding the dynamics of this policy.[2] After the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, there were calls by Western leaders to isolate the Bolshevik government, which seemed intent on promoting worldwide revolution. In March 1919, French Premier Georges Clemenceau called for a cordon sanitaire, a ring of non-communist states, to isolate Soviet Russia. Translating that phrase, US President Woodrow Wilson called for a "quarantine." The World War I allies launched an incursion into Russia, ostensibly to create an eastern front against Germany. In reality, the policy was anti-Bolshevik as well, and its economic warfare took a major toll on all of Russia. By 1919, the intervention was entirely anti-communist, although the unpopularity of the assault led it to be gradually withdrawn. The US simultaneously engaged in covert action against the new Soviet government. While the campaigns were officially pro-democracy, they often supported the White Terror of former tsarist generals like GM Semenov and Alexander Kolchak.[3][4] The US initially refused to recognize the Soviet Union, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt reversed the policy in 1933 in the hope to expand American export markets. The Munich Agreement of 1938 was a failed attempt to contain Nazi expansion in Europe. The US tried to contain Japanese expansion in Asia in 1937 to 1941, and Japan reacted with its attack on Pearl Harbor.[5] After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 during World War II, the US and the Soviet Union found themselves allied against Germany and used rollback to defeat the Axis powers: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Origin (1944–1947)Key State Department personnel grew increasingly frustrated with and suspicious of the Soviets as the war drew to a close. Averell Harriman, US Ambassador in Moscow, once a "confirmed optimist" regarding US–Soviet relations,[6] was disillusioned by what he saw as the Soviet betrayal of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising as well as by violations of the February 1945 Yalta Agreement concerning Poland.[7] Harriman would later have a significant influence in forming Truman's views on the Soviet Union.[8] In February 1946, the US State Department asked George F. Kennan, then at the US Embassy in Moscow, why the Russians opposed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He responded with a wide-ranging analysis of Russian policy now called the Long Telegram:[9]
Kennan's cable was hailed in the State Department as "the appreciation of the situation that had long been needed."[11] Kennan himself attributed the enthusiastic reception to timing: "Six months earlier the message would probably have been received in the State Department with raised eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have sounded redundant."[11] Clark Clifford and George Elsey produced a report elaborating on the Long Telegram and proposing concrete policy recommendations based on its analysis. This report, which recommended "restraining and confining" Soviet influence, was presented to Truman on September 24, 1946.[12] In January 1947, Kennan drafted an essay entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct."[9] Navy Secretary James Forrestal gave permission for the report to be published in the journal Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "X."[13] Biographer Douglas Brinkley has dubbed Forrestal "godfather of containment" on account of his work in distributing Kennan's writing.[14] The use of the word "containment" originates from this so-called "X Article": "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."[15] Kennan later turned against the containment policy and noted several deficiencies in his X Article. He later said that by containment he meant not the containment of Soviet Power "by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat."[16] Second, Kennan admitted a failure in the article to specify the geographical scope of "containment", and that containment was not something he believed the United States could necessarily achieve everywhere successfully.[17] , Harry S. TrumanAfter Republicans gained control of Congress in the 1946 elections, President Truman, a Democrat, made a dramatic speech that is often considered to mark the beginning of the Cold War. In March 1947, he requested that Congress appropriate $400 million in aid to the Greek and Turkish governments, which were fighting communist subversion.[18] Truman pledged to, "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[18] This pledge became known as the Truman Doctrine. Portraying the issue as a mighty clash between "totalitarian regimes" and "free peoples," the speech marks the adoption of containment as official US policy. Congress appropriated the money. Truman's motives on that occasion have been the subject of considerable scholarship and several schools of interpretation. In the orthodox explanation of Herbert Feis, a series of aggressive Soviet actions in 1945–47 in Poland, Iran, Turkey, and elsewhere awakened the American public to the new danger to freedom to which Truman responded.[19] In the revisionist view of William Appleman Williams, Truman's speech was an expression of longstanding American expansionism.[19] In the realpolitik view of Lynn E. Davis, Truman was a naive idealist who unnecessarily provoked the Soviets by couching disputes in terms like democracy and freedom that were alien to the communist vision.[20] According to psychological analysis by Deborah Larson, Truman felt a need to prove his decisiveness and feared that aides would make unfavorable comparisons between him and his predecessor, Roosevelt.[21] "I am here to make decisions, and whether they prove right or wrong I am going to take them," he once said.[22] The drama surrounding the announcement of the Truman Doctrine catered to president's self-image of a strong and decisive leader, but his real decision-making process was more complex and gradual. The timing of the speech was not a response to any particular Soviet action but to the fact that the Republican Party had just gained control of Congress.[23] Truman was little involved in drafting the speech and did not himself adopt the hard-line attitude that it suggested until several months later.[24] The British, with their own position weakened by economic distress, urgently called on the US to take over the traditional British role in Greece.[25] Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson took the lead in Washington, warning congressional leaders in late February 1947 that if the United States did not take over from the British, the result most probably would be a "Soviet breakthrough" that "might open three continents to Soviet penetration."[26][27] Truman was explicit about the challenge of Communism taking control of Greece. He won wide support from both parties as well as experts in foreign policy inside and outside the government. It was strongly opposed by the Left, notably by former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who ran against Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign.[28] Truman, under the guidance of Acheson, followed up his speech with a series of measures to contain Soviet influence in Europe, including the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program, and NATO, a 1949 military alliance between the US and Western European nations. Because containment required detailed information about communist moves, the government relied increasingly on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA conducted espionage in foreign lands, some of it visible, more of it secret. Truman approved a classified statement of containment policy called NSC 20/4 in November 1948, the first comprehensive statement of security policy ever created by the United States. The Soviet Union's first nuclear test in 1949 prompted the National Security Council to formulate a revised security doctrine. Completed in April 1950, it became known as NSC 68.[29] It concluded that a massive military buildup was necessary to deal with the Soviet threat. According to the report, drafted by Paul Nitze and others:
Alternative strategiesThere were three alternative policies to containment under discussion in the late 1940s. The first was a return to isolationism, minimizing American involvement with the rest of the world, a policy that was supported by conservative Republicans, especially from the Midwest, including former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Robert A. Taft. However, many other Republicans, led by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, said that policy had helped cause World War II and so was too dangerous to revive.[31] The second policy was continuation of the détente policies that aimed at friendly relationships with the Soviet Union, especially trade. Roosevelt had been the champion of détente, but he was dead, and most of his inner circle had left the government by 1946. The chief proponent of détente was Henry Wallace, a former vice president and the Secretary of Commerce under Truman. Wallace's position was supported by far left elements of the CIO, but they were purged in 1947 and 1948. Wallace ran against Truman on the Progressive Party ticket in 1948, but his campaign was increasingly dominated by Communists, which helped to discredit détente.[32] The third policy was rollback, an aggressive effort to undercut or destroy the Soviet Union itself. Military rollback against the Soviet Union was proposed by James Burnham[33] and other conservative strategists in the late 1940s. After 1954, Burnham and like-minded strategists became editors and regular contributors to William F. Buckley Jr.'s National Review magazine. Truman himself adopted a rollback strategy in the Korean War after the success of the Inchon landings in September 1950, only to reverse himself after the Chinese counterattack two months later and revert to containment. General Douglas MacArthur called on Congress to continue the rollback policy, but Truman fired him for insubordination.[34] Under President Dwight Eisenhower, a rollback strategy was considered against communism in Eastern Europe from 1953 to 1956. Eisenhower agreed to a propaganda campaign to roll back the influence of communism psychologically, but he refused to intervene in the 1956 Hungarian Uprising,[35] mainly for fear that it would cause the Third World War. Since late 1949, when the Soviets had successfully tested an atomic bomb, they had been known to possess nuclear weapons.[36] KoreaThe US followed containment when it first entered the Korean War to defend South Korea from a communist invasion by North Korea. Initially, this directed the action of the US to only push back North Korea across the 38th Parallel and restore South Korea's sovereignty, thereby allowing North Korea's survival as a state. However, the success of the Inchon landing inspired the US and the United Nations to adopt a rollback strategy instead and to overthrow communist North Korea, thus allowing nationwide elections under UN auspices.[37] General Douglas MacArthur then advanced across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. The Chinese, fearful of a possible US presence on their border or even an invasion by them, then sent in a large army and defeated the UN forces, pushing them back below the 38th parallel. Truman publicly hinted that he might use his "ace in the hole" of the atomic bomb, but Mao was unmoved.[38] The episode was used to support the wisdom of the containment doctrine as opposed to rollback. The Communists were later pushed back to roughly around the original border, with minimal changes. Truman criticized MacArthur's focus on absolute victory and adopted a "limited war" policy. His focus shifted to negotiating a settlement, which was finally reached in 1953. For his part, MacArthur denounced Truman's "no-win policy."[39] DullesMany Republicans, including John Foster Dulles, were concerned that Truman had been too timid. In 1952, Dulles called for rollback and the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe.[40] Dulles was named secretary of state by incoming President Eisenhower, but Eisenhower's decision not to intervene during the 1956 Hungarian Uprising made containment a bipartisan doctrine. Eisenhower relied on clandestine CIA actions to undermine hostile governments and used economic and military foreign aid to strengthen governments supporting the American position in the Cold War.[41] CubaIn the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the top officials in Washington debated using rollback to get rid of Soviet nuclear missiles, which were threatening the United States. There was fear of a nuclear war until a deal was reached in which the Soviets would publicly remove their nuclear weapons, the United States would secretly remove its missiles from Turkey and to avoid invading Cuba. The policy of containing Cuba was put into effect by President John F. Kennedy and continued until 2015.[42] VietnamSenator Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate for president in 1964, challenged containment and asked, "Why not victory?"[43] President Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic nominee, answered that rollback risked nuclear war. Johnson explained containment doctrine by quoting the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but not further."[44] Goldwater lost to Johnson in the 1964 election by a wide margin. Johnson adhered closely to containment during the Vietnam War. Rejecting proposals by General William Westmoreland for US ground forces to advance into Laos and cut communist supply lines, Johnson gathered a group of elder statesmen called The Wise Men. The group included Kennan, Acheson and other former Truman advisors. Rallies in support of the troops were discouraged for fear that a patriotic response would lead to demands for victory and rollback.[44] Military responsibility was divided among three generals so that no powerful theater commander could emerge to challenge Johnson as MacArthur had challenged Truman.[45] Nixon, who replaced Johnson in 1969, referred to his foreign policy as détente, a relaxation of tension. Although it continued to aim at restraining the Soviet Union, it was based on political realism, thinking in terms of national interest, as opposed to crusades against communism or for democracy. Emphasis was placed on talks with the Soviet Union concerning nuclear weapons called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Nixon reduced US military presence in Vietnam to the minimum required to contain communist advances, in a policy called Vietnamization. As the war continued, it grew less popular. A Democratic Congress forced Nixon, a Republican, to abandon the policy in 1973 by enacting the Case–Church Amendment, which ended US military involvement in Vietnam and led to successful communist invasions of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. AfghanPresident Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977 and was committed to a foreign policy that emphasized human rights. However, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, containment was again made a priority. The wording of the Carter Doctrine (1980) intentionally echoed that of the Truman Doctrine. Reagan DoctrineFollowing the communist victory of Vietnam, Democrats began to view further communist advance as inevitable, but Republicans returned to the rollback doctrine. Ronald Reagan, a long-time advocate of rollback, was elected US president in 1980. He took a more aggressive approach to dealings with the Soviets and believed that détente was misguided and peaceful coexistence was tantamount to surrender. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, American policy makers worried that the Soviets were making a run for control of the Persian Gulf. Throughout the 1980s, under a policy that came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided technical and economic assistance to the Afghanistani guerrillas (mujahideen) fighting against the Soviet army.[46] After Cold WarThe conclusion of the Cold War in 1992 marked the official end of the containment policy, but the US kept its bases in the areas around Russia, such as those in Iceland, Germany, and Turkey. Much of the policy later helped influence US foreign policy towards China in the 21st century. See also
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Look up containment in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. Page 2The Portuguese governor of Macau signing a statement of apology under a portrait of Mao Zedong. DateNovember 1966 – January 1967LocationMacau MethodsDemonstrations, strikes, boycottsResulted inThe Portuguese colonial government agreed to meet the demands of protestors, placing the colony under the de facto control of the People's Republic of China.Parties to the civil conflict
The 12-3 incident (Chinese: 一二·三事件; Portuguese: Motim 1-2-3) refers to political demonstrations and rioting against Portuguese rule in Macau that occurred on 3 December 1966. The incident, inspired by the Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China, occurred in direct response to a violent police crackdown by the Portuguese colonial authorities against local Chinese protestors demonstrating against corruption and colonialism in Macau. The incident is known as "12-3", in reference to the date of the riots.[1] Pressured by business leaders in Macau and the mainland Chinese government, the colonial government agreed to meet the demands of the protestors and apologized for the police crackdown. Portuguese sovereignty over Macau became severely diminished after the incident, leading to de facto Chinese suzerainty over the territory 33 years prior to the eventual official transfer of sovereignty.[2] OriginsThe Portuguese occupation of Macau is broadly divided into three different political periods.[3] The first, being the establishment of the first Portuguese settlement in Macau from 1557 until 1849.[4] During this period the settlement administrators only had jurisdiction over the Portuguese community.[3] The second period, known as the colonial period, scholars generally place from 1849 to 1974. It was in this period the Portuguese colonial administration began to take an active role in the lives of both the Portuguese and ethnic Chinese communities in Macau.[5] On 26 March 1887, the Lisbon Protocol was signed, in which China recognized the "perpetual occupation and government of Macau" by Portugal who in turn, agreed never to surrender Macau to a third party without the consent of the Chinese government.[6] This was reaffirmed in the Treaty of Peking on 1 December 1887.[6] Throughout the colonial administration of Macau, development of Portuguese Macau stagnated due to a complex colonial bureaucracy and corruption.[7][unreliable source?] Racial segregation and division also existed throughout society. Within the governance of Macau, almost all government officers and civil service positions were held by local Portuguese residents.[8] In September 1945, Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed to the Portuguese government a desire to transfer Macau back to Chinese control. However, due to the Chinese Civil War, discussions related between the Kuomintang and the Portuguese were postponed indefinitely.[9] In 1949, with the founding of the People's Republic of China a large number of refugees and Kuomintang supporters fled China to Portuguese Macau.[9] Before the 12-3 incident, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party parties both maintained a presence in Macau. With the founding of the People's Republic, the colonial Portuguese government opened unofficial relations with the People's Republic of China in contrast to the Republic of China due to its direct proximity of Macau with a land border. Following the founding of the PRC, the influence of the communists grew substantially in Macau especially among business leaders throughout the region, while it decreased with the nationalists.[10] The incidentSchools and education in Macau were divided on racial lines, with the Portuguese and Macanese sending their children to fully subsidized private schools while the Chinese population had to send their children to either Catholic or Communist schools.[11] The segregation of education in Macau was an area of great contention for the local populations.[11] In 1966, residents of Taipa Island, sponsored by the Chinese communists, tried to obtain permission to build a private school.[12] Despite being granted a plot of land by the Portuguese authorities, Portuguese officials delayed the processing of the building permits, as they had not received any bribes from the residents of Taipa Island.[12] In spite of receiving no building permits from the local administration, local residents began construction of the private school.[13] On 15 November 1966, Urban Services Officers on Taipa blocked further construction of the school, leading to a confrontation between Chinese protestors and Macau Police.[12] The police, including plain-clothes officers, injured over 40 people, of whom 14 were later detained.[14] In response, a group of around 60 Chinese students and workers demonstrated outside the Governor's Palace in support of the residents of Taipa Island. The demonstrators shouted revolutionary slogans and read aloud from Mao Zedong's Little Red Book.[15] On 3 December 1966, demonstrators began to riot and denounced Portuguese authorities for "fascist atrocities".[16] Protestors, instigated by local communists and pro-Beijing business owners, ransacked Portuguese institutions throughout Macau such as the Macau City Hall and Public Notary's Office.[8] Violence was also directed towards local Chinese businesses and organizations loyal to the Republic of China government now located in Taipei. Unlike in neighboring Hong Kong – which faced similar leftist riots – the business community largely did not back the colonial government. In Mainland China, specifically in Guangdong, Red Guards, inspired by the Cultural Revolution and angered by the violence towards Chinese in Macau, began to protest in large numbers at the mainland China–Macau border.[8] On 3 December, the colonial government ordered the rioters and demonstrators to be arrested, leading to even more mass discontent and popular support for opposition to the Portuguese administration. In response, demonstrators toppled the statue of Colonel Vicente Nicolau de Mesquita at Largo do Senado, the city center, and also tore off the right arm of a statue of Jorge Álvares located on the former outer harbor ferry port.[17] At the Leal Senado or city hall, portraits of former governors were torn off the walls, and books and city records were tossed into the street and set on fire.[18] Consequently, martial law was declared, authorizing a Portuguese military garrison and police to crack down on the protests.[2] Eight protestors were killed by police in the subsequent clashes, while 212 people were injured in total.[1] Police also arrested 62 people in connection to the protests.[19] ResolutionIn response to the crackdown, the Portuguese government immediately implemented a news blockade, Portuguese-language newspapers and magazines were banned, and newspapers in Portugal and overseas provinces were ordered to censor reports about the incident. In response to the incident, the Chinese government deployed the People's Liberation Army to the Chinese-Portuguese Macau border to prevent Red Guards from invading Macau.[20][8] Four Chinese warships also entered the waters of Macau in response to the crackdown.[8] The security ring set around Macau by the Chinese would be involved in multiple casualty-causing conflicts with Red Guards attempting to invade Macau by both land and by sea.[8]: 212–213 The pro-Beijing community in Macau adopted a "Three No's" approach as a means to continue their struggle with the Government — no taxes, no service, no selling to the Portuguese.[15] Representing Chinese Macau was the pro-Beijing Committee of Thirteen, chaired by Leong Pui, the leader of the pro-Beijing Macau General Association of Labour.[8]: 211 Negotiations to resolve and prevent further escalation between the People's Republic of China, Committee of Thirteen, and the Portuguese government took place in Guangdong. The chief negotiator for the Chinese was Ho Yin, whose involvement and commitment to resolve the crisis caused by the riot was crucial because at that time he was the only one who could contact directly both the Portuguese administration and Chinese officials in Guangzhou and Beijing, as he was the representative of Macau in the Legislative Council.[21] The Portuguese, due to increasing pressures from both Beijing and Lisbon, agreed to sign agreements with the Committee of Thirteen and the Guangdong Government Foreign Affairs Bureau, along with an official statement of apology, and accepted responsibility for the events on 3 December 1966.[22] On 29 January 1967, the Portuguese Governor, José Manuel de Sousa e Faro Nobre de Carvalho, with the endorsement of Portuguese Prime Minister Salazar, signed a statement of apology at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, under a portrait of Mao Zedong, with Ho, as the Chamber's President, presiding.[23][24] Alongside the apology, the Portuguese agreed to reinforce the role of the Macau Chinese business elite in running the governmental affairs of Macau, promised to never use force against the Chinese community of Macau, and agreed to pay reparations to the Chinese community in Macau to the sum of 2 million Macanese pataca as compensation for the eight dead and 212 injured.[25] In contrast, the agreement signed with the Guangdong government was more favorable to the Portuguese; per the agreement, the Chinese government would take back all refugees who arrived in Macau from 30 January 1967 on wards, a promise China would keep until 1978.[8]: 216 This marked the beginning of equal treatment and recognition of Chinese identity in Macau and the beginning of de facto Chinese control of the territory with Chinese Communist Ho Yin becoming the de facto governor of Macau.[2] The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Alberto Franco Nogueira, described Portugal's role in Macau after 1967 as "a caretaker of a condominium under foreign supervision".[23] Chinese media described the political situation of Macau as a "half liberated zone".[22][26] Shortly after the agreements were signed, Chinese military forces around Macau were withdrawn and the Red Guard threat had subsided.[25]: 235 AftermathWith the Portuguese now only nominally in control of Macau, political power would increasingly rest with the pro-Beijing trade unions and business leaders.[27] The official Portuguese and Chinese positions about the political status of Macau did not differ, as both now described the region as a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration and not a colony or overseas territory.[23][28][29] As a consequence of Beijing's increasing influence, pro-Kuomintang activities in Macau were banned, and the Republic of China's diplomatic mission was closed.[29][30] The flying of the flag of the Republic of China was banned, and Kuomintang-run schools were also closed.[16][29] In addition, refugees from mainland China were either barred from entering or returned to China.[21][29] Emboldened by their success against the Portuguese, the Committee of Thirteen encouraged demonstrations against other institutions in Macau that were perceived to be antagonistic towards the People's Republic. Specifically, the British Consulate and the Macau Branch of the Hong Kong Immigration department were once again targeted by protestors.[8] British consular staff in Macau were under constant threat and harassment by Red Guards, leading to the closure of the British consulate in 1967.[31][32] On 25 April 1974, a group of left-wing Portuguese officers organized a coup d'état in Portugal, overthrowing the right-wing ruling government that had been in power for 48 years. The new government began to transition Portugal to a democratic system and was committed to decolonization. The new Portuguese government carried out de-colonization policies and proposed Macau's handover to China to occur in 1978.[23] The Chinese government rejected this proposal, believing that an early transfer of Macau would impact relations with Hong Kong.[23] On 31 December 1975, the Portuguese government withdrew its remaining troops from Macau. On 8 February 1979, the Portuguese government decided to break off diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, and established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China the next day. Both Portugal and the People's Republic of China recognized Macau as Chinese territory. The colony remained under Portuguese rule until 20 December 1999, when it was transferred to China. Ho Yin's son, Edmund Ho Hau Wah, would become the first Chief Executive of the Macau Special Administrative Region following the transfer of sovereignty in 1999.[33] See also
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What was the name of the policy that aimed to prevent the spread of communism by blocking Soviet influence?
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