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Inventorying wildland vegetation. Taking a crop census to determine water use. Monitoring snow cover accumulation, melt, and change, in irrigation and hydro electric catchments. Mapping extent of fire scars and rate of revegetation. Supplementing and updating orthophoto coverage of Indian lands. Publishing image maps of unmapped or poorly mapped regions of Antarctica and other regions at 1:250,000-, 1:500,000-, and 1:1,000,000-scales in support of National and international cooperative programs. "Quick response" mapping of flooded areas. Examples of some current uses of aerospace technology in the exploration for and management of specific natural resources are described below.
Imagery from Landsat and aircraft is used routinely by the Department as a tool for fuels and mineral exploration and to improve the quality and speed of major fuels and mineral resource mapping programs. In the southern Powder River Basin, Wyo. (Raines and others, 1978a), many of the uranium producing areas are obscured by vegetation that covers 50-75 percent of the ground. A Landsat computerenhancement technique was developed to map the regional vegetation variations that reflect subtle changes in lithology, chiefly the a proportions of sandstone and mudstone. By this technique it was discovered that uranium deposits are associated with a particular lithology that has an intermediate sandstone/mudstone ratio. Lineament analyses were used to develop a model for the influx of uranium-bearing ground water into the basin and subsequent deposition of uranium. In a jointly funded United States-Mexico experimental project in northern Sonora, Mexico (Raines and others, 1978b), analysis of lineaments and limonitic occurrences seen on Landsat images was used to identify promising areas for more detailed geologic mapping and geochemical surveys. Strike-frequency analysis E mapped lineaments indicated the presence of two statistically significant trends, northeast and northwest. At least four northeast/trending lineament zones were defined and are interpreted to be structural zones that were the primary regional control of mineralization in the porphyry copper deposits of northern Sonora. Al though northwest-trending structures also may have influenced the localization of 24 ore deposits, these are prevasive structures which are not useful as regional pros pecting guides. In contrast, the northeast-trending lineament zones are localized and systematic and are characterized by concentrations of limonitic hydrothermally altered rocks, occurences of known copper deposits, and anomalously high lead content in stream sediment. These data along with other geochemical and geophysical data have resulted in the identification of several areas of exceptional economic potential, and this approach has become an integral part of the mineral appraisal studies being conducted by the department. Field investigations in the Williamsport Valley, Pa. (Pohn and Purdy, 1979), to identify lineaments shown on Landsat return beam vidicon images revealed the presence of six discrete fault zones whose strike is subparallel to the trend of the Appalachian folds. These zones range from 0.5 to 1.75 km in width and from at least de 10 km to more than 50 km in length. Many thrust faults of only a few centimeters displacement are present within each zone and occur at low angles in the beds of "staircase-type" folds. The extreme degree of faulting and staircase-type structures may indicate fracture porosity traps for gas and oil at depth. The EROS Data Center developed a digital geologic data base for a portion of the Nabesna quadrangle, Alaska. The data base incorporated Landsat MSS data, Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) topographic data, and Alaskan Mineral Resources Assessment Program (AMRAP) data sets, including residual aeromagnetic data, Bouguer gravity data, stream sediment geochemical data (for copper, lead, gold, chromium, and cobalt) geologic data, mineral occurrence data, and land status data. All map data was digitized into a common format, interpolated to generate continuous data arrays, resampled, and geographically registered. The data base was used to develop and test a geologic model for evaluating porphyry copper potential in the area. Output products generated to define the model included imaged raw data and derivatives, stereoscopic merges of Landsat MSS data and gravity, aeromagnetic, and geochemical copper data, and integrated ratios of aeromagnetic and gravity data and geochemical copper and chromium data. The final output was an image that incorporated all of the regional model parameters within the data base to show areas of highest porphyry copper potential. Page 3
Landsat imagery to estimate range and forest production in Wyoming, and monitor ground cover and soil changes in Arizona. Resource Inventory and Assessment in Alaska The USGS/EROS Field Office in Anchorage is assisting the Bureau of Land Management on a variety of training activities and inventory projects. These activities include a land cover mapping project on the Seward Peninsula which is part of a caribou/reindeer carrying capacity study, and an inventory project to provide information for environmental assessments required of all oil and gas lease areas on Alaska's North Slope, including the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska. BLM personnel are trained to use the Field Office digital analysis equipment to produce land cover maps using Landsat data and to merge with this data digital terrain data, including information on elevation, slope and aspect. BLM personnel are able to develop new maps which show combinations of important cover types and terrain characteristics. The increased inventory activities of the BLM result from mandates in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA, December, 1980) which provides for new oil and gas leasing activities on Alaska's North Slope and for comprehensive plans for new conservation areas which comprise over 100,000,000 acres in new national parks, refuges, forest systems and conservation areas. Forest fuels mapping TUTO M. B. Shasby and G. R. Johnson at the EROS Data Center completed in fiscal year 1980 a cooperative demonstration project with the U.S. Forest Service's Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula, Montana. The purpose of the study was to develop a digital data base of forest fuels and topographic data to serve as input in In de mathematical fire simulation models. The fire simulation models integrate fuels and 1 topographic data with weather information to provide site specific estimates of fire behavior. The behavior model is a relatively new tool which provides Forest Service fire managers with a consistent method for predicting the behavior of forest and rangeland fires. Applications of the estimates provided by this model range from realtime, site-specific predictions of the probable rate of spread of a flaming front to broadscale regional planning efforts. At present fuels and topographic data of the nature required to drive the simulation model are available only on a limited basis. The methodology that was used brought together Landsat multispectral scanner data and U.S. Geological Survey digital elevation model data to meet this information need. This project has taken a significant step towards integrating Landsat and digital terrain data directly into the management information system process. By entering the data provided by this study into the mathematical fire model to simulate wildland fires and by varying other input variables such as meterological data, a whole scenario of fire behavior patterns and planning regimes can be generated and evaluated. Wildlife habitat mapping The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service turned to Landsat during the past year to help assess habitat for greater and lesser prairie chickens, both endangered species in Oklahoma. Traditional field surveys have failed to explain the dramatic decline in prairie chicken populations in recent years. Landsat data analysis was used to provide a cost-effective means of assessing this decline. The relationship between density of male prairie chickens and land cover types from Landsat classification closely parallels the relationship found between density of males and field measurements of percentage grass and brush. Since field data collection over large areas is expensive and time-consuming, it was concluded that Landsat analysis, combined with limited round data collection, may provide a means of cing overall habitat assessment costs. Archeology The NPS, working in close cooperation with EROS and several other Federal agencies and major universities, is using remotely sensed data from Landsat and aircraft to identify and evaluate historic and prehistoric cultural resources in the national parks. In the San Juan Basin Regional Uranium Study, sponsored by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, remotely sensed data was used to assess the effects of uranium exploration and development upon the parks and archeological sites in the region. This is but one of a number of projects utilizing remotely sensed data for cultural resources evaluation ranging from Alaska and Oregon to Louisana, Virginia and Pennsylvania. Page 4
REFERENCES Carter, W. D., and Rowan, L. C., 1978, A world wide approach to remote sensing and mineral exploration: 12th International Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment, Manila, Philippines, v. 1, p. 387-394. Hastings, D. A., 1981, A first look at the Magsat anomaly map, emphasizing Africa. In review for presentation at the American Geophysical Union Spring Annual Meeting, Baltimore, MD, 25–29 May, 1981. Hemphill, W. R., Stoertz, G. E., Markle, D. A., 1969, Remote Sensing of luminescent materials: International Symposium on Remote Sensing of Environment, 6th, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1969, Proceedings, p. 565-585. Johnson, C. R., Barthmaier, E. G., Gregg, T. W. D., and Aulds, R. E., 1979, Forest stand classification in western Washington using Landsat and computer-based re source data: International Symposium on Remote Sensing of the Environment, 13th, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1979, Proceedings: Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, v. 3, p. 1681-1696. Langel, R. A., Estes, R. H., Meade, G. D., Fabiano, E. B., and Lancaster, E. R., 1980, Initial geomagnetic field model from Magsat vector data. Geophys. Res. Letters, v. 7, p. 793-796. National Academy of Sciences, 1976, Resource and environmental surveys from space with the Thematic_Mapper in the 1980's: The National Research Council , Commission on Natural Resources, Committee on Remote Sensing for Earth Re source Surveys, Washington, D.C., 122 p. National Research Council, 1977, Microwave remote sensing from space for earth resources surveys: National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 139 p. Pohn, H. A., and Purdy, T. L., 1979, thrust fault zones in the Allegheny Plateau of north-central Pennsylvania: U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 79-1604, 5 p: Raines, G. L., Offield, T. W., and Santos, E. S., *1978a, Remote Sensing and subsurface definition of facies and structure related to uranium deposits, Powder River Basin, Wyoming: Economic Geology, v. 73, p. 1706-1723. Raines, G. L., Theobold, P. K., Kleinkopf, M. D., Lee Moreno, J. L., and De la Fuenta Duch, M. F., 1978b, Base metal exploration case history (abs.): Symposium of the International Association on the Genesis of Ore Deposits, 5th, Snowbird, Utah, Program Abstracts, p. 148. Regan, R. C., Cain, J. C., and Davis, W. M., 1975, A global magnetic anomaly map: Journal Geophysical Research, v. 80, no. 5, p. 794-802. Watson, R. D., Hemphill, W. R., Hessen, T. D., and Bigelow, R. C., 1974, Prediction of the Fraunhofer line detectivity of luminescent materials: International sympo sium on Remote Sensing of Environment, 9th, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1974, Proceedings, p. 1959-1980. Watson, R. D., Henry, M. E., Theisen, A. F., Donovan, Terence, and Hemphill, W. R., 1978, Marine monitoring of natural oil slicks and man-made wastes utilizing an airborne Fraunhofer line discriminator: Joint Conference on Sensing Environmental Pollutants, 4th, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1977, Proceedings, p. 667-671. [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Page 5
important, also, to note that our task was to identify generic factors—that is, the things that appear to be common to several different projects. We were not to conduct an indepth or an exhaustive audit of any particular project. We talked to a large number of people, both in and outside of Government. They were very open and candid with us, telling us a great deal in confidence. As a matter of fact, without those discussions, I do not think it would have been possible for us to have successfully completed the study. But for both of these reasons that is, the confidential nature of the discussions we had with these d large numbers of people and the fact that we did not conduct an indepth audit of any particular project-I would appreciate the subcommittee's acceptance of a study team ground rule which we have followed in all of our presentations on the study results, ob namely, I would prefer not to discuss any individual project by name. Senator SCHMITT. Let's think about that. I don't know that it is up to the Congress to agree to that kind of a stipulation, but we will see how it goes. Dr. HEARTH. Fine. We can come back to that if you like. When I talked to Dr. Lovelace at the outset, we recognized that the composition of the study team would be very important because this was the kind of assignment that does not lend itself to a quantitative analysis. It was important, both of us felt, that the study team be composed of experienced project managers in their own right. So, we selected a group of 10 experienced senior NASA people, most of whom have long experience in project and program management. So you will understand how we approached the study, first of all, we talked to many NASA people, ranging all the way from the NASA Comptroller, most of the program associate administrators, most of the center directors, and about 20 or 30 NASA project managers. We held discussions with them and asked them, generally, what they felt were the key factors at work in project manage ment within NASA today and the way it has been in the past. We a combined the results of those discussions with the views which we, as a study team had initiated and which resulted in a combined list of 26 possible factors to look for. In our detailed examination during that same time period, we also collected data on NASA projects since its inception in 1958. We examined, in various ways, the technical cost and schedule s performance of all these projects. From that examination, we then selected a group of what we called representative projects. And 1 despite my best efforts, we ended up with 13. These projects were chosen because they were representative, in that they were implemented in time periods, all the way from 1968 up until the present. They experienced a large range of cost growth, all the way from essentially zero to well over 100 percent. They were various types of projects including planetary, Earth orbital, aeronautical, and one major construction of facility project. They were also implemented by different program offices, different field centers, and different contractors. For each of those projects we reviewed the project documentation carefully, and we met with the key people. Page 6
Dr. HEARTH. I might point out that this conclusion was made very apparent to us from our conversations with the industry people. This was a surprise to me. I didn't expect this one. The fourth generic factor that we included in conclusion 1 is poor tracking of contractor accomplishments against approved plans in a timely fashion, leading to late identification of problems. That is the NASA project office not having sufficient visibility of contractor accomplishments, which we addressed in the recommendations
As I indicated, we will have recommendations on each of those four items included in conclusion 1. In conclusion 2, there are five factors that have been significant contributors to good cost and schedule performance of several NASA projects. The first is the function of the NASA project manager. As we indicated, he or she is the most important individual in the NASA project management process. The second factor under conclusion 2 is adequate definition of the project to be implemented. This is the reverse of what we found and noted in conclusion 1, and we clearly have found examples of both. The third factor involves proper planning and management of project contingencies-clearly a positive factor in several of the projects we have looked at, and there are various elements of that as indicated in the testimony. The fourth factor involves the early understanding between NASA and the implementing contractor of the project's scope, implementation plans, and interfaces. That is developing an early understanding outside of the competitive process, and I will have more to say about this later. This action was actually taken in several of the projects we looked at, and we believe resulted in very positive results. There were also many examples of good implementation of the project by the NASA project team and the contractors. So those are the generic factors we found that we believe had had a positive effect, and there is one of those, namely that of an early understanding between NASA and the implementing contractor, item 2(d), which we feel can have wider application. Conclusion 3 includes three factors that were noted to us in our early discussions as being significant that we frankly found were not significant. First is the ability to make initial cost estimates within an accuracy of about 30 percent. That assumes that you have a good definition of the project. We believe there are sufficient techniques available to come up with cost estimates within about 30 percent if you know what it is you are making the cost estimate for. The second item included under conclusion 3 is nonutilization of classified technology. Several people felt that NASA and/or its contractors' limited access to classified technology was resulting in a higher cost or cost growth in NASA projects. We found absolutely no evidence of that. Third, excessive influence of the user communities on NASA projects. What we mean by "users", is other agencies of the Federal Government or the scientific community continually making changes to the project during implementation and, therefore, driving up the cost. We did not find significant evidence of that. Page 7
Dr. HEARTH. In the case of Apollo, project management in the way that I am using the term was really done by General Phillips at NASA Headquarters. Senator SCHMITT. Then we're still not communicating. I would have said that project management in that program was divided into several different project levels, the booster level, the spacecraft level, and those had project management at various centers with programmatic integration at the headquarters level. Dr. HEARTH. I would not disagree. If you remember, most of the projects we looked at did not have those kind of characteristics of developing a launch vehicle at the same time as a spacecraft. Senator SCHMITT. I understand. And a big program, I mean, a program of that magnitude does require different management techniques. But still, I want to be sure, absolutely sure, that when we have further questions, that we are communicating properly. Dr. HEARTH. When I say "project management," I mean in the sense that you said originally before I confused the issue with my Apollo example. OK, the third recommendation has to do with contractor selection. This is probably our most misunderstood recommendation. Let me read it and then try to explain it. Selection of contractors should be based primarily on technical considerations, the bidder's management capabilities, management implementation plan for the project, and past performance. This relates directly back to conclusion 1(c). We are not saying in this recommendation that dollars are not important. Dollars are clearly one significant input into the source selection decision process. What we are saying is that more discriminators should be identified and considered in these other areas, and that dollars, while they are important, should be one factor out of several. This recommendation unfortunately has been misinterpreted that we do # not think dollars are important, and that is clearly not our intent. Senator SCHMITT. Isn't it where you are most subject to a court challenge? Dr. HEARTH. We have had, and I personally have been involved in, some protests on selections where the selections have been based on things other than dollars. That is true, if that is what you mean by your question. Senator SCHMITT. I shouldn't have said "court," but I meant a challenge. Dr. HEARTH. I might add that I think that experience has influenced the behavior of some source selection officials. Senator SCHMITT. And has contributed to increased costs, right? Dr. HEARTH. I think what has happened, going back to the earlier conclusion that there is a clear perception in industry that, if you want to win a NASA contract in the competitive process, you need to get through a technical gate, and then if you really want that contract, then bid as low as you think you can. As a consequence, we have had some artificially low bids. And then, of course, you are starting off the project at a disadvantage because all of your plans are based upon artificially low bids and, as I indicated earlier, to reinforce perhaps overoptimisim on the part of the NASA people who are pushing that particular project. I think what we need to do in the thrust of this recommendation is to change Page 8
results within the committed resources; second, the succession of this commitment through the center director to the program associate administrator to the Administrator; and third, the fundamental importance of sufficient preliminary effort to appropriately define the work to be done. This leads back to the main issues that you were suggesting, Mr. Chairman: that this work be completed in an effective and meaningful way; that the areas of allowance for I uncertainty and risk and the required resources be clearly defined; and that continuous assessment of progress achieved versus re11 sources expended be maintained. That would be the first set of e policy documents. The second set would expand on that policy, giving background and implementation approaches. Finally, the third set would be the NASA management instructions themselves, which would emphasize those activities consid ered to be most important. : Senator SCHMITT. Could I interrupt at that point, and ask you: Does this include a serious look at the decisionmaking process, and in particular the escalation of the decisionmaking that has ocI curred over 22 years? What I feel in NASA, and I'm sure happens in other agencies, is that when a problem develops within a project, at a certain level within a project, there is a tendency to not solve that management problem at that level, but to move the decisionmaking up one level, hoping that that means the problem won't reoccur. Well, the net result of this is that you have, I guess now, 27 signatures needed on a sheet, in order to get the Administrator to send out a letter. It was 14 when I was there. Are you really seriously going to try to move authority back down to the project manager? Dr. CALIO. That is the intent. Senator SCHMITT. What this does is underline project management authority, and nobody looks at the project manager any more, as the sort of guide. 1 Dr. CALIo. I understand what you are saying, and I have delineated that particular three-step approach because we must have a policy which clearly articulates that responsibility. Then, we have to know who has what responsibility up the line from the project manager through the Administrator. Senator SCHMITT. I understand that. But between the lines here, there may be a whole bunch of other people that the Center Director, or the Associate Administrator, or the Administrator looks to, in order to sign off before he signs off. That's where we've run into problems. So, I hope that we're going to cut out some of that managerial overhead. Really, this is the essence of the hardening of the arteries, for an agency such as this. Dr. Calio. There are two aspects to that. I can understand it in some instances, but there are some checks and balances that need to be built into the system. One of the most important is to insure that only necessary procedures are built into the system. Senator SCHMITT. That's right. But there's always going to be a tendency for a manager at one level to institute a decisionmaking process to cover his rear, over mistakes that might be made by Page 9
Now we are talking about a cost-type procurement. I want to emphasize that point again. Although I did not sit in the hearing you had this morning, perhaps we are pushing too hard in this area, but if we do not change the perception in the industry that NASA tends to select the low bidder for a cost-type procurement, we are going to be faced with the kind of problems that you referred to earlier, Mr. Chairman. We will be dealing with artificially low bids. As a result of our study, we found clear evidence that such bids can result in cost growth, because you are dealing with, frankly, an artificial plan at the beginning. Senator GORTON. I have no doubt that that is the case. I just had some reservatiions about the cure. Dr. HEARTH. As a source selection official, I do too. In fact, it is ironic that in the first selection I made after I submitted this report to Dr. Lovelace, I did not pick the low bidder, and I got a protest, so you can be faced with questions regarding a particular selection from the General Accounting Office too. But, I think, part of our message here is a message to my fellow colleagues who are in that position that sometimes you had better do what your judgment calls to be best, and if it results in a protest, it results in a protest. Senator SCHMITT. We are going to have to, unfortunately, move to the next panel in a moment. We will have questions for the record, because we never get as far as we like to. Don, in the course of your study, did you identify any serious, erosion in non-Shuttle-related projects, in-house NASA engineering capability as the parallel managerial cross-check and budgetary cross-check on the contractor's performance? Dr. HEARTH. We specifically looked to determine if we could find any evidence of a degradation of NASA's in-house capability, and we found none. We think that the caliber for the in-house capability is as good today—and I'm talking in a general sense now, is as good today-as it was, say, 10 years ago. Senator SCHMITT. Did you see any projects where for some reason or another there was deemphasis of NASA's in-house engineering, parallel engineering activity? What had traditionally seemed to be one of the strengths of NASA project offices, was that they had sufficient resources to, literally, keep a contractor honest. I don't think that is a good expression, but it is competition. It is the competition to win contractors. Dr. HEARTH. I think that what conclusion 1 says is that one of the generic factors was insufficient visibility on the part of NASA contractor activities. To answer your question directly, there were instances where we did not feel that the NASA project offices had sufficient people to adequately penetrate the contractor. So I guess in that sense, the answer to your question is "yes.” Senator SCHMITT. Were there isolated instances, or did that seem to be a generic problem? Page 10
Dr. HEARTH. Part of it was, I think, isolated. We did see a generic problem in many cases that we did not have proper visibility, but not all of those cases were that due to lack of people. Senator SCHMITT. Well, was it a lack of proper people, or people not doing their job, or what? Dr. HEARTH. The reason we worded the recommendation the way we did on that point, where we talked about NASA establishing a policy, et cetera, was because we felt that there was perhaps some confusion within NASA, frankly, on what the agency policy is relative to "penetration of the contractor." Is that really the agency policy or not? Senator SCHMITT. My goodness. There was never any confusion when I was there. Dr. HEARTH. I know that; but we found that there was some confusion on that point, therefore, we said, let's straighten it out. That is why we worded the recommendation that way. As we point out in the recommendation, it does require a strong in-house capability, because you have to have the right kinds of people to do that. I think it is incumbent upon all center directors, assuming now we are talking about a project and a lead center, to insure they have that capability. They shouldn't take the project on if they do not. Senator SCHMITT. Now, on the other side of the managerial spectrum, did you see any indications of a significant lack of programmatic resources at the headquarters level, to, in a sense, keep the centers honest; to keep the project management honest? Dr. HEARTH. No; there was no problem there. Senator SCHMITT. So unlike the recommendation that came out of the Shuttle review a year or so ago, where one of them related to the fact of inadequate programmatic resources at headquarters, in the kind of projects you were reviewing, you did not see that as a problem? Dr. HEARTH. That is correct. Senator SCHMITT. Now, you made a very broad statement about the age gap, the aging of the Agency, however, there are still a large number of very highly qualified now quite experienced, relatively young personnel at the centers, who are still at the centers, and are still in nonmanagerial positions. Do you think NASA has fully reached down to tap the talent? It seems that they've hired an awful lot of retired people, or rehired them. Dr. HEARTH. The thrust of that comment is that if you look at most NASA centers, we have a lack of a significant number of people in, say, the 25- to 35-year age bracket, which is a result of the hiring practices over the last 10 years, where we have not fully replaced attrition. I think that tends to be true at most NASA centers. The point here is that in the future, you are going to have a lack of 35- to 45-year-olds. That is generally where you find your good project managers. Therefore, we are just citing that as a concern. Senator SCHMITT. You're looking at that as a future problem? Dr. HEARTH. We cited that as a future concern. We brought it to the attention of the agency managment, so they were aware of it. Senator SCHMITT. Well, there should be no current lack, because there are a lot of 45-year-olds that cut their teeth in a very active phase. Page 11
We also believe that during the proposal selection phase, a more rigorous evaluation of contractor resource proposals, that is the manpower and materials the contractor intends to apply to performance, will ultimately lead to better contractual baselines from which to initiate "understanding" efforts.
It is also fully recognized that good project management involves continuous assessment and validation of technical and cost baselines beyond any initial understanding between NASA and contractor project personnel. At these checkpoints in the process, management decisions must be made regarding whether or not project realignment might be necessary and to what extent. If a project is realigned, we recognize the need for timely revisions to our budgetary and procurement processes to compensate for the redirection. We intend, as part of our implementation plan, to re-emphasize these essential integrated elements of project management and the procurement process.
In the area of budgeting, our preliminary assessment is that no policy changes are required for implementation of the study recommendations. However, our process in reaching budgetary estimates for specific projects will be more explicitly defined particularly with regard to the establishment of reserves.
potential increases in technical complexity
known factors whose cost impact is uncertain (e.g. TBD specifications)
In addition to those basic project requirements for development
With regard to inflation, the clear intent of the Study Team
To make certain that the insights and substantive values of Dr. Hearth's study were made widely available even before any formal implementation approaches were decided upon, we have asked him to review his group's findings with all of NASA's top managers and with appropriate elements of the Navy and the Air Force. At the same time, as we study implementati possibilities, I find it is very valuabie to have top managers from Goddard, Marshall, and JPL on my steering group to provide the assurance that the objectives of the study recommendations can, in fact, be practically met through the right mix of policy, procedure, and attitude changes we are examining. An early value, of course, is that a number of Centers have already taken the findings to heart and are working within their own authorities and scope to inpi ove the project management process.
My current schedule calls for another meeting of the steering group in April. At that time we expect to consider finished drafts of our proposed implementing recommendations and instructions.
In response to the recommendations of the Project Management Study, NASA is carefully reviewing how best these recommendations could be adopted. After consideration and approval by NASA management, we expect to take action in all areas where it is appropriate to do so and to continue to pursue those others which require coordination.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. Dr. Hearth, myself and our associates will try to answer any questions that you and your colleagues may have.
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space United States Senate
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
It is a pleasure for me to review for the Subcommittee the results of the Study on NASA Project Management, of which I was the study leader.
Last October, Dr. Alan Lovelace (at the time, NASA's Deputy Administrator) directed me to form a small NASA team to conduct a study of NASA Project Management. Dr. Lovelace established the following objectives for the Study:
To assess project management in NASA with emphasis
To recommend appropriate NASA actions to deal with
He also established the following groundrules for the Study:
The Study Team should consider all aspects of
The Study Team should not investigate in depth any
As I will indicate, the Team talked with many people, inside and outside of NASA. Some of those individuals have been associated with projects that have experienced large cost growth. All of the individuals were extremely open and candid, and told us a great deal in confidence. Because of this, we were able to identify the major generic factors that aggravate cost growth of NASA projects. However, it is because of this, and the fact that we did not conduct a detailed, exhaustive audit of any projects that I must ask you to accept a groundrule which the Study Team adopted for itself, and has strictly adhered to in all of our presentations of our Study results. Namely, that we will not discuss the performance of individual projects.
Before discussing the Study results, I will briefly summarize the composition of the Study Team and how we performed the Study. When Dr. Lovelace and I discussed this assignment last October, we recognized that the results would have to be based primarily upon the judgment of the Study Team members since the task did not lend, itself to quantitative analysis. Consequently, team members were selected who have broad experience in Project or Program Management within NASA. The Team was an excellent group of people, and exhibited the sound judgment and insight required.
Our initial activity was to interview a large number of NASA managers. These included NASA's Comptroller, Chief Engineer, most of the Program Associate Administrators and Center Directors, and about 20 to 30 NASA Project Managers. The purpose of these interviews was to identify those project management factors that the managers believe are important today, and how the factors may have changed in the last 10 to 15 years. When combined with the Team members' initial views, these interviews provided a "menu" of factors to examine later in the Study. At the same time, we gathered performance data for the NASA projects implemented during the past 22 years. From these data, we selected 13 specific projects that we examined in some detail. This group of projects was representative of all of those projects conducted by NASA since 1958--they were implemented during different time periods; experienced a large range of cost growth (from 0% to over 100%); were various types of projects (space flight, aeronautics, construction of facilities); and were implemented by different NASA Program Offices, Field Centers, and Contractors. We examined each of these projects by reviewing project documentation, and by also meeting with the Program Offices in NASA Headquarters, the Project Offices in the NASA Field Centers, and with the key Contractors. Page 12
From this phase of the Study, the Team identified a number of generic factors which appeared to have significantly influenced (either in a positive or a negative way, the cost and schedule performance of several NASA projects. This led to a set of Tentative Conclusions and Recommendations. These were then "tested" in that we re-examined each of the representative projects and examined an additional 10 to 15 projects. We pursued the question, "What would have happened if the Tentative Recommendations had been in place at the time the project was implemented?" This resulted in several changes to the tentative results, and, finally, led to the results that I will discuss today.
During the Study, we also reviewed the experience of the Department of Defense. In addition, we reviewed reports of the General Accounting Office which summarize the cost experience of almost a trillion dollars worth of government projects.
The results of the Study were agreed to unanimously by the Study Team in mid-January 1981, and presented to NASA management on January 21, 1981. The following general comments are viewed by the Study Team as an important introduction to the specific Conclusions and Recommendations.
Throughout its 22-year history, NASA has undertaken technicallyadvanced projects. By their very nature, these projects incorporate high levels of technical, financial, and schedule risk. Historically, NASA's overall project management performance has been good; project successes have been very high, and cost performance has, generally, been good compared to other organizations engaged in technically-advanced projects.
NASA's cost management in the last decade has improved over the 1960's. However, the advent of constrained budgets in the 1970's has forced even tighter fiscal management. In this environment, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress treat early cost estimates as firm commitments and significant cost growth is not tolerated. During recent years, several projects have experienced major cost increases without apparent forewarning. This has damaged NASA's credibility and reputation for successful project management. Actions by NASA management are, therefore, necessary; particularly, in light of NASA's external environment and the pressures on government budgets. The Study Team verified, from its examination of a group of representative projects, that the cost performance of a project is closely related to the application of sound project management principles and/or the use of available management tools.
Therefore, the Study Team's Conclusions and Recommendations are not intended to suggest the super positon of either an additional hierarchy of management, or the addition of new management tools within the current NASA system. Rather, they stress the need for continuing application of the basic principles of sound project management by NASA, refinement of existing management tools, and the continuing verification, by NASA's top management, that the principles are being followed and available tools are being used.
One final observation before discussing the specific Conclusions and Recommendations--good people are the key to good project management. Sound project planning, management practices, and source selection approaches are all important. However, they cannot substitute for having high quality, and highlymotivated people responsible for project management; both inside and outside of government.
The Study Team's Conclusions and Recommendations are as follows:
The following have been significant contributors to cost and schedule growth of several NASA projects:
Technical complexity of the projects. Limited advanced technology development and inadequate
Over-optimism, in terms of the cost and schedule the budget cycle.
Inadequate evaluation of the project's technical complexity and risks leading to either insufficient or inappropriate reserves (fiscal, schedule, and technical).
NASA's tendency to select the low bidder in the competitive
The following have been significant contributors to good cost and schedule performance of several NASA projects:
The function of the NASA Project Manager. The most
Adequate definition of the project to be implemented prior to the NASA decision to proceed with the project and the Agency's commitment to OMB and the Congress. Proper planning and management of project contingencies, including:
Establishment of contingencies on the basis of
Forecasting the commitment of contingencies on the basis of development and expenditure plans.
Tracking contingency requirements.
Early understanding between NASA and the implementing
Good implementation of the project by the NASA project management team and the contractor (s).
The following apparently have not had a significant effect on cost and schedule growth of several NASA projects:
The inability to make initial cost estimates (assuming a good definition of the project), within an accuracy of about 30 percent.
Excessive influence of the "user" communities of NASA projects.
During the late 1970's, the Nation experienced sustained
NASA uses many terms and definitions to describe monies budgeted for unexpected changes: "APA," "reserve, ". "contingency," etc. In addition, there is no consistency, within NASA, in the application of this management tool.
Some NASA space projects have experienced cost growth in the development and implementation of their ground segments and the integration of the ground and space segments. This has been due to lack of understanding of the overall design complexity and the maturity of the overall project definition prior to implementation. This is particularly evident in high data volume projects.
In some cases, the management of technically-complex projects has been assigned to multiple NASA Centers without proper consideration of each Center's capability or of the management and technical relationships between the Centers. The management problems and intercenter friction resulting from such a situation can contribute to cost growth.
A project will experience' increased technical, schedule, and cost risk when it is dependent on the parallel development of critical supporting project systems that are outside of the Project Manager's authority.
The following were observed in the Study and are of concern for the future.
The shift of emphasis in industry away from NASA
The composition of the NASA workforce in terms of strong candidates for project management positions. As a result of these conclusions, the Study Team adopted the following Recommendations:
NASA should continue to pursue technically-advanced projects and expect cost growth in some of its projects in the future.
Existing policies for project planning and definition activities, a) NASA Management Instructions should incorporate the requirements for pre-project Analysis and Definition
Sufficient funding for definition should be included in
A "Project Initiation Agreement" signed by the appropriate Page 13
If the proposed project is a spaceflight mission, the solicitation and selection of flight experiments are generally made while the OMB and the Congress are considering the NASA budget request. Study Team-No change. If the proposed project requires a prime industrial contractor (for the spacecraft, for example), the RFP may be issued before final congressional action on the budget is completed. In most cases, contractor selection is made after the beginning of the fiscal year in which the project implementation is to start. Study Team-Contractor evaluation and selection would consider various factors (Recommendation 3). Prime contractor RFP's would normally be issued after the budget request is submitted to the Congress but before final congressional action. Upon selection of the payload and the prime contractor and congressional approval, the project is implemented through completion (launch, mission operation, and data analysis, for example). During implementation, the NASA Project Office manages the project and makes the necessary trade-offs between performance, risk, cost, and schedule. The OMB and Congress monitor project progress and the annual NASA budget cycle provides the opportunity for budget adjustments and authorization and appropriation of funding for each fiscal year. Each year, the NASA Comp troller re-examines the impact of inflation. Study Team-After selection of the prime contractor, NASA and the contractor would perform the "early understanding” (Recommendation 5). Following this activity, the NASA Project Manager would finalize the commitment (Recommendation 5). This will include a reevaluation of project reserves (Recommendation 7). The NASA Project Office would be required to closely follow contractor activities during implementation (Recommendation 4). Budget commitments by the Project Manager are adjusted for inflation (Recommendation 6). Question. In a recent GAO study, it was recommended that NASA include direct civil service costs in project estimates. NASA disagrees with this approach stating that these are relatively fixed costs and are not directly affected by excluding or including any one project. Could you please elaborate on this. Answer. NASA's position that civil service personnel costs are relatively fixed and are not directly affected by excluding or including any one project has remained unchanged. This was a decision made at the beginning of NASA to establish an institutional capability in the NASA in-house organization. We do not include a listing of staffing needs each time a new project is initiated since we view our civil service staffing as part of our institutional core capability. This capability is not sized by individual project staffing requirements or an aggre gation of projects. Rather, it is sized by such considerations as a base for technical analysis and evaluation, specific research and development expertise for near- and long-term needs, and an independent capability to perform test and evaluation of hardware. We feel that the basic approach that we have taken is consistent, and has served us well over the years. We have attempted to maintain a relatively stable civil service workforce to conduct the programs that do get approved and in the short term not to vary that with individual project decisions. Question. Your study included various types of projects including spaceflight, aeronautics, construction of facilities, etc. What differences did you notice between these? Answer. Very little differences between the “types” of projects were observed. It should be noted, however, that the sample of aeronautics and construction of facilities projects examined in the study was relatively small. Question. Did you talk with either former Administrators or former Program Managers? Answer. We interviewed former NASA officials, including former Center Directors and former Program Associate Administrators. We did not interview former NASA Administrators. Question. The Study did review the experience of the Department of Defense. Could you please elaborate on some of the similarities and differences betwen NASA and DOD? Answer. We held discussions with representatives of the Air Force Systems Command and the Naval Air Systems Command. The only significant difference between our conclusions and their experience appears to be the effect of inflation. Inflation effects appear to be higher for the Department of Defense projects than for NASA projects because (a) they tend to be material intensive (rather than labor intensive), and (b) their projects last longer in time (generally including production runs). Page 14
Question. Did you examine the types of contracts, i.e., fixed costs, cost plus incentive, etc., and the relationship between the types of contracts and meeting costs and schedules? If so, please elaborate. If not, why not? Answer. We did not specifically study the effect of contract type because the number of fixed-price contracts within NASA projects is relatively small. Question. Have you noticed any significant changes in the make up of the industries competing for NASA contracts? Do you feel there have been barriers to new entrants? What do you think of these barriers? Answer. We did not identify any particular barriers to "new entrants.” In recent years, there appears to be fewer companies competing for NASA contracts. As indicated in Conclusion 9, other business opportunities (commercial and DOD) appear to be somewhat more attractive to industry than NASA business. In addition, most of NASA's contracts are for “one-of-a-kind” and, thus, may not have the same profit potential as other business prospects. Question. One comment that has been made recently is that the resolution of problems (decisions) are not made at the appropriate management level. Please comment on this. Answer. When a project gets into trouble, there is a tendency to elevate decisionmaking authority away from the Project Manager to organizational levels above the Project Manager. While this appeared to have occurred in some of the projects we examined, we found no direct negative effects on project cost. Question. In conclusion 1, you state that technical complexity of projects has contributed to cost and schedule growth. Are projects or programs getting more complex than they were? Answer. Many NASA projects being implemented today are more complex than NASA projects undertaken ten or fifteen years ago. However, we believe that they are about the same in relation to the state-of-the-art at the time. For example, a typical project conducted in 1980 is more complex than a typical project conducted in 1970; however, the projects are approximately the same in relation to the techno logical state-of-the-art in 1980 and 1970, respectively. Question. Would you estimate how much the average cost growth might be expected based on technical complexity?-recognizing each project is different. Answer. This answer is a personal opinion since the Study Team did not examine 2. this question. For a well-managed project with very high technical complexity, a !1 cost growth of up to about 50 percent is possible. For a well-managed project with relatively low technical complexity, a cost growth of up to 15 percent is possible. Question. Did continual changes in program scope of specification emerge as a major problem or generic problem? 201 Answer. No. While this occurred in some of the projects we examined, we did not 11 feel that it was common enough to be classified as “generic.” Question. Is the size of a project significant to the growth problems in relative terms? Answer. No. The generic problems, and their relative effect, appeared to be 1 independent of project size. Question. Have you noticed a decreasing interest in industry to participate in 21 NASA programs? Please explain? Answer. Yes. Other business opportunities (commercial and DOD) appear to be * somewhat more attractive to industry than to NASA business. In addition, most of us NASA's contracts are "one-of-a-kind” and, thus, may not have the same profita potential as other business prospects. Question. What problems do you foresee, if any, by selecting contractors on considerations other than cost? Answer. I would like to again reiterate that cost must always be a factor in the source selection decision. The thrust of our Recommendation is that more emphasis o should be placed on discriminators in areas such as technical considerations and past performance. The difficulties with placing more emphasis on such factors is that it is difficult to quantify differences between proposers. Question. Your Recommendation 8 suggests that NASA should minimize the management interfaces required for program implementation. Could you present a "typical” current case for mismanagement interfaces and then an “ideal" case? Answer. A "typical” project which prompted this Recommendation is one in which two Centers were together on a project and the management interfaces were not fully defined and agreed upon by the Centers until a few years after project implementation began. Ăn “ideal" case is one in which either full project responsibility is assigned to one Center, or where the management interfaces between the two or more Centers involved in the project are defined very early in the definition period and one Center is assigned project management responsibility. Page 15
In summary I feel that the Hearth group has performed an effective self analysis of NASA program management. The emphasis in the NASA implementation plan appears to be correct and from our industrial perspective we will certainly support the implementation. Project difficulties, schedule slips and costs overruns are our mutual concerns since we all share in the consequences. We must also recognize however that the advanced technologies with which we are dealing inevitably involve various degrees of risk. Recognition of risk and risk management is thus one of our greatest challenges at all phases of a program. We must continue to study and analyze both our problems and our successes and to extract and implement the lessons which each provides. I thank you for your time and attention. Senator SCHMITT. Thank you, sir. Mr. Rosenberg. STATEMENT OF ALLAN J. ROSENBERG, VICE PRESIDENT, GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION Mr. ROSENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to offer comments on NASA's recent project management study. I would commend the study team for their conduct of the study and their to obvious understanding of NASA and its industry partners. GE is in substantial agreement with the observations and recommendations put forth. We have enjoyed a long and productive relationship with NASA, spanning the last 20 years, and feel that NASA has fulfilled its charter to operate at the leading edge of technology, which brings with it an assumption of inherent risk. Under such conditions, some cost growth should not be surprising. Nevertheless, there are actions which can be taken to control such growth and to mitigate its impact on our space program. In my testimony today, I will single out a few specific recommendations for comment. I concur with the recommendation that thorough studies at early stages of program definition should be used to insure that the competitive phase is initiated on the basis of realistic budget estimates. But I should like to dwell more on contractor selection today because the purpose of the competitive phase is contractor selection, and I believe that this process can and should be modified. Most of NASA's major competitive procurements over the last 20 years have been awarded to the lowest technically competent bidder, a fact that is not lost on industry. The preeminence of low cost in contractor selection frequently causes contractors to submit achievable, but optimistic cost proposals. There is an inconsistency here-selection is based on the quoted cost, but success is based on technical performance. We strongly urge that the process be changed so that selection is based on the same factors as successnamely, technical excellence with recognition of past performance. Goddard Space Flight Center has already directed that cost realism be emphasized as a key evaluation factor in future procurements, and obviously this is on the right track. We believe that another constructive step would be to modify the evaluation criteria to require that companies specify the resources, both in manpower and dollars, that should be available for contingencies. This would be a difficult task, but one in which maximum advantage could be taken of past experience. It would be a vast improvement over the all too common present practice of quoting to a 100-percent success scenario. However, this carries the penalty of higher cost, which today is a losing strategy under existing procurement practices. So proposers are forced to assume successful programs and optimistic results. Page 16
ments; number and size of organizations which must interrelate during program; complexity of these relations; duration and complexity of required test programs. Both the NASA and qualified contractors have the necessary experience and judgment to evaluate and make provisions for the unpredictable factors which make realistic contingency planning necessary. Question 6. Would you be willing to provide NASA with "available contingencies” in your proposal? Answer. Certainly, provided that the RFP be thorough and explicit in such requirements, and that all offerors be required to respond to them in appropriate detail. Question 7. Could you please elaborate on the Cost Performance Measurement System? When did GÉ initiate this? How has it been working? Has early detection of problems worked? Answer. The Cost Performance Measurement System (CPMS) was specified as the basic management system for Landsat D during the rebaselining, beginning in September of 1980, and took effect January 1, 1981. It has several unusual features: (a) Cost measurement and performance extend down to the lowest work package level, making every manager a cost account manager. (b) The reporting and measurement criteria are based on earned value for a given period rather than traditional cost, technical, or schedule milestones. (c) Cost and schedule are constantly compared, so that the cost of a schedule variance is always known. (d) Measurements are made weekly, and all deficiencies are reported to the program manager for corrective action. (e) Systematized methods are provided for “get well” planning and monitoring as the corrective action is applied. (f) The system detects variances on any work package at each stage of the program, for early detection of slippage. (g) Trend analysis and forecasting are done to focus management attention on potential areas of anomaly. (h) Full visibility by both government and contractor management is provided. CPMS is now a routine management tool for Landsat D, and is giving excellent results for both GE and NASA. Question 8. If you took the factors of: cost, technical excellence, past performance, management implementation plan for project, and any other factors you might suggest, how would you put relative weights on these factors? Answer. The relative value and importance of these factors will vary widely from one program to another. The important judgments must be made, and key discriminators selected, on how the factors should relate to one another for the best interest of the program at hand. Technical excellence, for example, should be closely correlated with cost, particularly in technically challenging systems. Evaluation and selection authorities should ask the question, "Is it likely that the technical conception of the offeror can be executed within the quoted cost?” Any doubt should be reflected in a lower rating for the technical conception itself. Unrealistic costing should be taken as prima facie evidence that the offeror does not completely understand the requirement. The same should apply to the management implementation plan, for which the relevant question should be, “Does the plan show that this offeror has a proven and practical mechanism for cost control and accountability?" The important principle is that evaluation be made by interrelating the factors peculiar to each program. This will avoid the tendency to regard discriminators as "gates” through which all offerors pass, a tendency which has resulted in inordinate emphasis on quoted cost alone as the most important contractor selection criterion. Question 9. There seems to be at least general agreement that selection of contractors should be based on things other than strictly or mostly cost. Do you feel NASA currently has adequate technical capability to evaluate proposals? Answer. As can be deduced from my answers to 5 and 8 above, I have confidence that NASA has the requisite capability. The important principle is that the contractor be required to incorporate cost realism in his proposals, and that cost be related to all the other factors on which he is to be scored rather than standing alone as a key discriminator. Question 10. Mr. Rosenberg stated that cost growth is often built into the program at early stages. Is there agreement on this issue? Would you say this is one of the most significant factors? Answer. This was also covered in the Hearth study, where cost growth was attributed to the following early deficiencies: Inadequate definition prior to budget decisions; limited advanced development; over-optimism in cost and schedule re Page 17
motors were selected for simplicity and safety. System redundancy was not an issue. We simply had to fill the gap until the more sophisticated space tug was developed. But this space tug development did not proceed as planned and it became evident that, rather than being interim, the IUS was going to be on line well into the 1990's. This expanded role of the IUS included more spacecraft and mission types than previously envisioned. Savings through increased reliability became obvious. This drove us to a totally autonomous vehicle with a reliability of better than 0.96 unprecedented in an upper stage. Actually, we've set our target at 0.98 reliability and data currently shows that we're exceeding that. But to reach this point, we had to blaze the way technologically. Among the developmental "firsts" we've logged are: First completely redundant avionics system ever developed for unmanned systems capable of correcting failures within milliseconds. First strapdown, triply redundant inertial measurement unit. First application of a 65,000 word solid state computer in a space/boost environment. First guidance system capable of retargeting from earth orbit to accommodate different deployment opportunities. First flight propulsion system using a 3D carbon/carbon nozzle throat and an extendable exit cone. First program to fully comply with the Air Force's new MIL-STD-1540A (testing) and SAMSO-STD-73-2C (electronic piece parts). (This “first” cannot be over-stressed. We anticipated these standards would cause major program impacts but, even so, these impacts far exceeded our expectations. On the other hand, compliance with both of these standards will pay back with high mission assurance. More about this later.) There are more "firsts,” but I think I've already made my point: We've facedand have overcome-many technical complexities of sorts not originally envisioned. The Hearth report points out the risk of concurrent development elements. In the case of the IUS, the parallel development of the Space Shuttle caused many revisions to the IUS interface. This concurrent development led to about 150 interface changes over a three-year period. At one point, the design of the IUS's cradle in the Shuttle was even suspended due to uncertainty in the definition of Shuttle environments. Time demands also forced us into internal IUS schedule concurrencies. Technological developments upon which we expected to lean never happened. For instance, we fully expected to use propulsion technology developments from both the MX and Trident programs in the IUS. However, schedules for these programs were delayed to the point where the Boeing IUS became the ground-breaker. But, largely, we've now done it. The IUS two-stage vehicle is a reality. I wish I could take all of you through our spacecraft manufacturing area to see how far we've come. Vehicle component qualification testing is 85 percent complete. The first flight vehicle is in acceptance testing. Its pathfinder vehicle is fully assembled and undergoing electromagnetic interference (EMI) testing in our ane choic chamber prior to blazing the trail to Cape Canaveral. Fabrication of the first eight flight vehicles is 86 percent complete. It has been hard work, but well worth it. I mentioned mission assurance. Now let me explain. A vehicle with a 90 percent reliability will be unsuccessful one time in 10. And, obviously, a stage with 96 percent or 98 percent reliability will be far, far more successful. An examination of a representative mission model of, say, 40 flights shows that a 98 percent reliable IUS will save some 600 million dollars over an upper stage with a reliability of 90 percent. And this estimate is quite conservative. In other words, in these 40 flights the government will be saving more than will have been spent on the entire IUS development. And this is without consideration of the fact that the loss of an Air Force satellite at a crucial time could be expensive beyond estimation in a national defense sense. In addition to reliability, IUS also offers flexibility and safety. Its design is such that it can meet a broad spectrum of payload needs. Indeed, it can be a family of upper stages through the selection of large and small motors. And the safety of these solid-propellant motors is particularly important in relation to the Shuttle and its crew. As I've described, IUS development has not been easy. When Boeing, the Air Force and NASA entered full-scale development three years ago, our eyes were wide open. We knew we were planning a sophisticated intertial stage, and not a simple interim vehicle. Simply put, we underestimated the job. As Dr. Hearth's study pointed out, failure to understand the significance of technical complexities can be expensive. Page 18
Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. The project management on Landsat D does have that authority and it is working. Senator SCHMITT. How do you gentlemen feel about the idea of a phase B' which NASA and the contractor would try to sort things out and make sure you're ready to move aggressively into a phase C? Mr. Rosenberg? Mr. ROSENBERG. I think that fundamentally on the type of programs that we've been talking about, it is a very good idea. I think that if it is a followon, in the true sense of followon, of an existing program, then it would have a tendency to slow things down. As I mentioned in my statement, I also feel that we need to be cautious about using that time after the award to have our engineers, both in the contractor's house and in NASA's house, suddenly decide that there are a lot of other things that they would like to add to the program and add scope that might not be necessary. And I would just mention that as a cautionary note. The idea of a slow start, however, I think is a good one which I would endorse. Senator SCHMITT. Mr. Miller, do you have any comment? Mr. MILLER. Well, I would add to what I said earlier. The pro grams that we would consider successful had a mature baseline design before selection. They had systems specifications that were developed, including definition of major interfaces. We had assessed risk and we had identified the critical technologies. We had done those things that are part and parcel of recommendation 5. I believe they should be done prior to the selection of the contractor. Senator SCHMITT. Do any of you gentlemen find in your dealings on particular projects with NASA centers that there is an excessive amount of center competition? Dr. ODER. In the early phases of some programs there is a lack of decision on the part of NASA headquarters as to which center they feel should carry out the program, and there is some jockeying for position-there has been in the past-by the centers to do the program. They are all technically keen and ambitious and want to show their capabilities on that particular endeavor. So it is not an unnatural thing. But let go for too long it does one very bad thing. It tends to dilute and waste technical resources which in this country in this day we cannot very well afford. Senator SCHMITT. Are any of your organizations reacting in any specific way to the Hearth report? Or are you waiting for NASA to react? Mr. ROSENBERG. I think some of the steps we have taken in regard to Landsat D, while not a direct result of the Hearth report, were taking place concurrently with the study, and I would say in that sense that some of the recommendations are being implemented. Senator SCHMITT. Was that done at your initiative? Mr. ROSENBERG. That was done jointly with NASA in terms of the program reviews that have been added and the added management controls, and so on. Senator SCHMITT. Mr. Miller, is Boeing doing anything in reaction to the report? Mr. MILLER. From the standpoint of advocating, and urging as complete an understanding as possible of a job prior to selection, Page 19
Camp Springs, Maryland, and then directly to the user. A new remote command feature was added to the system; now the user can change the configuration of one or more DCPs in the network by sending a command directly to the DCS computer which relays the command by satellite to the platforms. This feature saves time and reduces errors inherent in a manual system. The GOES Data Collection System (DCS) has more than 1200 Data Collection Platforms operated by 54 national and international users. Two new direct-readout stations went into use in 1980 with three more expected to became active during the next year. Revised platform certification standards were developed to cover emergency, interrogate, random reporting, and self-timed platforms. These new standards extend the oscillator stabilities to – 40°C, improving performance in cold environments. After the GOES DCS automated monitoring system becomes operational in 1981, a random reporting feature will be adeed. Random reporting allows a data collection platform to transmit a short emergency message, based on preset thresholds, on the same channel that it routinely uses to report. The present emergency system required an alternate channel to be used for nonscheduled broadcasts. The GOES Weather Facsimile (WEFAX) service is broadcast from three geostationary satellites located at 75°W, 105°W, and 135°W. WEFAX users now number some 88 national and international fixed land stations, more than 60 mobile stations on ships, and with military strike teams. More than 230 satellite image sectors are broadcast over this system every day in addition to standard meteorological products. Land Satellites. On November 16, 1979, the President assigned NOAA manage ment responsibility for all civil operational remote-sensing activities from space. The Department of Commerce was directed to develop a transition plan for moving to an operational, land remote-sensing satellite system. Accordingly, NOAA, with NASA and other interested Federal agencies, has developed the plan for transition from the present experimental, NASA Landsat program to an operational NOAA program. A public document, "Planning for a Civil Operational Land Remote Sensing Satellite System: A Discussion of Issues and Options, issued by NOAA's Satellite Task Force on June 20, 1980, identified policy and technical issues to be resolved for a fully operational system: continuity of the data during the 1980s' user require ments and performance options; revenues, pricing policies, and financial assistance; institutional approaches to private sector ownership; market expansion; international implications; and required legislative and regulatory authorities. The document also discussed the creation of an interagency Program Board for continuing Federal coordination and regulation and a Land Remote Sensing Advisory Committee of 15 representatives from the interested, domestic non-Federal users. More than 1500 copies of the Issues and Options document have been distributed to members of Congress, foreign governments, private industry, state and local organizations, and other non-Federal users. The Administration is now reviewing a legislative proposal designed to achieve private sector ownership of the land remote sensing satellite system during the 1980s and to authorize NOAA to operate the Landsat-D system until this transfer is accomplished. Legislation will be forwarded to the Congress in the near future. Ocean Satellites. NOAA joined NASA and the Department of Defense in preparing for development of a National Oceanic Satellite System (NOSS). The NOŠS goal was to provide a time-limited operational demonstration of a remote sensing system which would supply global oceanographic data under all weather conditions. An operational demonstration with a duration of five years was planned to commence after the initial spacecraft was launched in mid-1986. During 1980, the triagency NOSS program defined requirements, agreed_on agency responsibilities, and awarded four system definition study contracts. The nine-month A-109, Phase 1 studies will conclude in May 1981 with a report and contractor proposal for system implementation. Because of budget reductions, the NOSS program has been deleted from NOAA's fiscal year 1982 budget. The NOSS triagency program management has initiated an orderly phase-down of activities. To assure the usefulness of the information and experience gained, program officials plan to: complete the Phase 1 studies which are due in May; complete preliminary evaluation of the instrument proposals; and complete the initial algorithm develop ment tasks and contracts and establish a complete documentation file, both secure and open, for all of the significant documentation generated. The NOSS A-109 Source Evaluation Board (SEB) will remain active for at least one year to protect the Phase 1 studies and proposals under SEB procurement regulations during that period. Authorized government officials from the three participating agencies will, however, have access to all the NOSS documentation. The NOSS documentation file will be maintained at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, Maryland. Page 20
indicated that the surfacing behavior of the animal had interfered with transmissions; modified transmitters are being developed for field-testing early next year. Two major cooperative remote-sensing experiments (Superflux I and II) took place in the Chesapeake Bay area by the Fisheries Service, National Ocean Survey, the Coast Guard, NASA, and a number of local universities. The objectives of the experiments were to evaluate remote-sensing techniques for assessing marine environmental quality, enhance understanding of marine ecosystem processes, and pro vide a synoptic data base for application to problems of ocean resources and environmental management. They used aircraft-mounted salinity, temperature, chlorophyll, and turbidity sensors, the Landsat multispectral Scanner, the Nimbus 7 Coastal Zone Color Scanner, and extensive surface truth sampling. Indications are that both experiments were successful, although comprehensive analyses of the data are not yet complete. The Fisheries Service cooperated with NASA and NESS in collecting surface truth data for the color scanner. Chlorophyll, particulate, and irradiance measurements were taken along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Gulf of Mexico to assist in developing computer programs for the scanner data and for scanner data bases for ecosystem modeling and assessment. The Fisheries Service used satellite-acquired thermal and color data of the Pacific Ocean to direct research vessels to likely areas for albacore tuna and provided synoptic charts of sea surface temperature and chlorophyll distribution for studies of anchovy spawning. Research continued on the use of Seasat scatterometer data for estimates of surface-layer transport in the Gulf of Mexico. Shrimp and menhaden appear to depend extensively on surface current for transport of their eggs and larvae from offshore spawning grounds to the estuarine nursery areas. Satellite-acquired surface-wind-stress data could help develop yield forecasts for these species well in advance of normal fishing seasons. The 1980 effort concentrated on developing a water current model to be tested in 1981. Historical wind stress data (not from Seasat) will be used to determine the accuracy of yield forecasts from satellite data. A cooperative cost-benefit, technical-option study was completed on use of a satellite-aided communication and data relay system for observers on board foreign fishing vessels operating in the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone. The National Marine Fisheries Service, National Weather Service, Coast Guard, and NASA examined law enforcement, fishery management, and research data requirements. A conceptual, optimized communication system was described, in which satellite locationing systems installed on fishing vessels would accept coded data from small, hand-held data loggers operated by the observers. A research project was begun in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic conservation zone using fishery and environmental data collected by observers on Japanese tuna longline vessels. GOES and NOAA thermal and Nimbus 7 color data are being examined for correlation with data om the fishing vesse to determine the feasibility of a satellite-aided tactical fishing system for domestic long-liners fishing for tuna and swordfish. The Northeast Fisheries Center is assisting in developing a proposal for a New England area remote sensing system. The proposal system would be designed to provide remote-sensing data to two centralized points, one for ocean data, the other for land data. After processing, the data would be made available to a broad range of federal, state, academic, and private users. The year 1980 marked the first production of Alaskan sea surface temperature charts, used extensively by fisheries. The charts have been excellent for determining the arrival of herring in Bristol Bay. One processor reported savings of nearly $8,000 a day in personnel and equipment costs. Commercial fishing for silver salmon around Southeast Alaska was improved by location of the 11°C isotherm. The catch increased from 50 to 200 salmon a day, and trolling costs (fuel, equipment, and time) were significantly reduced. With the onset of winter, the ice edge is also included on the charts and is used extensively by the crab fishery and the Fish and Wildlife Service to inventory marine mammals. During the summer of 1980 the NESS Satellite Field Services Station at Honolulu coordinated a joint U.S. Navy-Air Force-NOAA program for providing satellite sea surface temperature information to the fleet of albacore boats fishing in the North Pacific between Hawaii and Alaska. Sea temperature information acquired by the Air Force from the NOAA-6 satellite, and pictures from NOAA's GOĒS-3 western satellite, were used at the Naval Western Oceanography Center for charts broadcast by radio facsimile three days each week. Ship captains used the charts to help find favorable fishing waters. Page 21
1 Additional funding will be required in subsequent years to complete the instruments and to process and analyze the data. These funds also are included in the NESS appropriation on page 34.
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., April 8, 1981. Hon. HARRISON H. SCHMITT, Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR SCHMITT: In response to your request, I am pleased to submit for the record a statement on the National Science Foundation's (NSF) space-related activities. This focuses on parts of NSF-supported basic research that involve cooperation with NASA. I think that past activities of this nature have proved quite successful. As the enclosure indicates, most of NSF's space-related activities grow out of the Foundation's role as lead agency for support of U.S. ground-gased astronomy, although other NSF activities are involved as well. The NSF funds obligated and planned for space-related activities are $2.4 million in each year for fiscal year 1980 and fiscal year 1981 and $2.0 million in fiscal year 1982. Outlays in the same amounts are anticipated. I hope this information together with the enclosed statement will provide the needed overview of NSF space-related activities. If more information is needed, please let me know. Sincerely yours, JOHN B. SLAUGHTER, Director. Enclosure.
STATEMENT ON SPACE-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION NSF's space research and cooperation with NASA are related largely to the Foundation's role of major Federal fund source for U.S. ground-based astronomy, and more particularly the five National Centers for Astronomy. There is also a significant ground-based program in upper atmosphere physics. Various cooperative activities are undertaken. NASA satellites provide data for experiments and studies by university researchers receiving NSF grants, and the Foundation supports some Page 22
In space we suggest that the Subcommmttee reinstate in full the programs proposed to be delayed or deleted from the fiscal year 1981-1985 NASA budgets by the new Administration, and that you urge the Administration to restore the 840 NASA personnel slots they have eliminated. The total dollars involved represent only a tiny fraction of the increase in defense budgets, for example, and yet constitute what we believe to be an irreplaceable investment in the future from both economic and national security viewpoints. Specifically, we urge that full funding for the fifth shuttle orbiter option be restored, that the current fleet of expendable launch vehicles be maintained until the shuttle has proved itself capable of assuming the launh demand burden, that a high-performance (cryogenic) orbital transfer vehicle development be initiated as soon as possible, and that the Advanced Space Transportation Capabilities program, which offers the flexibility for evaluating new and imaginative ways to utilize our new space transportation system, be reinstated and expanded. We believe the relatively small programs in space applications such as the National Oceanic Satellite System, the geological applications program, the AgRISTARS project, and the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite are all wise investments, and should not be deleted or delayed. Reducing space materials processing support seems economically inexplicable in the face of the recent General Accounting Office report, for example, which calls for a doubling or tripling of such efforts to meet foreign competition. And the almost miniscule NASA investments in technology transfer and utilization would appear to us to be the very last that an administration dedicated to private sector investment would want to eliminate. Our major concern, however, is the implication of the proposed budget cuts in space science. Here we feel most strongly the lack of evidence of an overall longterm federal space policy. Fortunately the Space Telescope program has remained intact, but it is virtually the only one. The Explorer program, which provides involvement for the broader scientific community, must be sustained. Delaying the Gamma Ray Observatory, the unanimous choice of the Space Science Board when it was initiated, introduces serious inefficiencies and, ultimately, greater costs. We are truly dismayed by the proposed cancellation of the joint US-European International Solar Polar Mission, not only because of its considerable scientific value, but also because it effectively kills any future cooperative ventures with our friends and allies overseas. Other programs in solar terrestrial research, a key area for eventual application of scientific knowledge, are endangered by the proposed cuts. Shuttle/Špacelab Science Payload Development, an important use of the new systems on which we have spent so much this past decade, should certainly not have been cut. Life sciences, critical to the manned space operations we have just resumed, suffers from budgetary starvation. And in planetary exploration, only Galileo remains (and even it has had to be delayed)—a far cry from the days when the U.S. led the world in space exploration and reaped the accompanying benefits in national prestige. Deleting the Solar Electric Propulsion Stage and the joint NASA/Air Force Ion Auxiliary Propulsion System Program (for a savings of only $1 million!) will prejudice not only our future space science efforts, but also potential defense-related orbital transfer capabilities. În summary, the NASA budget is precisely the wrong place to demonstrate parsimony, despite the need for reducing federal expenditures, since it represents one of the very few federal investments in our future. It will return many times its cost in tax revenues, balance of payments, and employment, as has already been demonstrated by the aviation and satellite communications industries. We have attached a number of supporting documents to our statement. We hope you will enter both the full statement and these documents into the record. Thank you for this opportunity to express our views. Sincerely yours, JERRY GREY, Administrator, Public Policy. Enclosure.
STATEMENT OF DR. JERRY GREY, ADMINISTRATOR, PUBLIC POLICY ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS The AIAA is the aerospace professional society whose membership of 30,000 individual engineers, scientists, and students encompasses all the technical disciplines of aeronautics and space. As in past years, we are grateful for this opportuni Page 23
ty to acquaint the Subcommittee with our views on the proposed NASA fiscal year 1982 budget in both these areas of technology. In examining the aeronautical research and technology budget for 1982 as pro posed by the Administration, even including the $11.2 million supplement recently recommended by the House Science and Technology Committee, we note that it continues to decrease, representing a drop during the past two years of 14 percent, or over 30 percent in real funding after allowing for inflation. It is therefore necessary to reiterate the point we have stressed year after year: NASA aeronautical research and technology nurtures the growth of the United States aviation industry, which last year generated taxpaying revenues of over $50 billion, a net balance of trade of over $11 billion, and except for automobile manufacturing employed more people than any other industry in this nation. It was the aeronautical research conducted by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the 1940's and 1950's that was in good part responsible for today's U.S. dominance of the world aviation market; but the paucity of support for advanced technology in recent years has been a major factor in the rapidly increasing market penetration by foreign manufacturers, who are accorded greater financial support by their governments. NASA's most recent 5-year plan for aeronautical research and technology, as with the 5-year plan before it, indicated substantial growth in fiscal year 1982 and the years beyond. The rate of growth projected by these plans has never been met in the past, and is not met by the current fiscal year 1982 budget. We believe the proper level for investment in the advanced research and technology which "seeds' the $50 billion aviation industry should be at least double what it is today. We recognize, of course, the urgency of keeping federal budgets under control, but the return on this modest investment, in the form of enhanced GNP, employment, balance of payments, and tax revenues clearly warrants such an increase. We hope you will support it. We turn now to specific items in the proposed fiscal year 1982 NASA budget for aeronautics. Of the subject areas we have identified in previous years, there are two which continue to grow in importance but not in real-dollar budget allocations: avionics and alternative fuel technology. NASA's excellent capability in avionics could well serve our problem-ridden air traffic control system, as well as many on-board fuel conserving functions in engine and aerodynamic-surface controls. We do not believe there is sufficient emphasis on-or utilization of-this capability. As the highly successful Aircraft Energy Efficiency program winds down, it is clear that it must be supplemented by a major effort aimed at the effective utilization of alternative fuels in all aircraft types and models. Although we still have years of fossil-fuel availability remaining, the writing on the wall has been clear for some time: sooner or later, aircraft will have to be powered by alternative fuels, and the orderly transition to such fuels-shale-derived, coal-derived, and, eventually, liquid fuels derived from inexhaustible future energy sources such as solar or fusion-must be made well before the inexorable deadline. Again, we believe this should become a major NASA effort comparable in scale to the ACEE program. Our most important message today deals with a proposed new start which has now been deleted from the fiscal year 1982 budget: the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator. We consider this to be a program of such considerable significance that our Technical Committee on Fluid Dynamics has made it the subject of a special study. Their position, which has also received the endorsement of the related Technical Committees on Aeroacoustics, Air Breathing Propulsion, Aircraft Design, and Plasamadynamics is given in the following paragraphs: “The Fluid Dynamics Technical Committee of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics endorses the development by NASA of the Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator (NAS). Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) has emerged as a powerful new tool having the potential for greatly enhancing aeronautical research and development. The application of CFD to many important aerodynamics problems is limited, however, by the computational power available with modern supercomputers. “There is a need for a substantial increase in computer size and speed to meet the needs of researchers and engineers in aerodynamics, and other technical disciplines such as hydronautics, structures, meteorology and chemistry, by the mid-1980's. Inadequate marketing incentives preclude the development of such capability without government support. For over 35 years national needs have caused the Federal Government to be the chief force behind the development of large-scale computers. This has enabled the U.S. to hold a world position of leadership in supercomputers. Government sponsorship of NAS will provide the impetus to help maintain that position. Page 24 |
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