Which of the following is not a condition that has to be met when using individual incentives?

1. Arrow KJ. Agency and the market. In: Arrow KJ, Intriligator MD, editors. Handbook of Mathematical Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier; 1986. pp. 1183–1195. [Google Scholar]

2. Adams JL, Mehrotra A, Thomas JW, McGlynn EA. Physician cost profiling—reliability and risk of misclassification. N. Engl. J. Med. 2010;362(11):1014–1021. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa0906323. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

3. Alchian AA, Demsetz H. Production, information costs, and economic organization. Am. Econ. Rev. 1972;62(5):777–795. [Google Scholar]

4. Baker G, Delbanco S. Pay for Performance: National Perspective. 2006 Longitudinal Survey Results with 2007 Market Updates. San Francisco: Med-Vantage; 2007. [Google Scholar]

5. Benavent J, Juan C, Clos J, Sequeira E, Gimferrer N, Vilaseca J. Using pay-for-performance to introduce changes in primary healthcare centers in Spain: first year results. Qual. Prim. Care. 2009;17(2):123–131. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

6. Berwick DM. The toxicity of pay for performance. Qual. Manag. Healthc. 1995;4(1):27. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

7. Buetow S. Pay-for-performance in New Zealand primary health care. J. Health Organ. Manag. 2008;22(1):36–47. doi: 10.1108/14777260810862399. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

8. Caldis T. Composite health plan quality scales. Health Care Financ. Rev. 2007;28(3):95–107. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

9. Campbell SM, Reeves D, Kontopantelis E, Sibbald B, Roland M. Effects of pay for performance on the quality of primary care in England. N. Engl. J. Med. 2009;361(4):368–378. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa0807651. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

10. Chen, T.T., Chung, K.P., Lin, I.C., Lai, M.S.: The unintended consequence of diabetes mellitus pay-for-performance (P4P) program in Taiwan: are patients with more comorbidities or more severe conditions likely to be excluded from the P4P program? Health Serv. Res. (28 Sept 2010) [PMC free article] [PubMed]

11. Chien, A.T., Li, Z., Rosenthal, M.B.: Improving timely childhood immunizations through pay for performance in medicaid-managed care. Health Serv. Res. 45(6, part II), 1934–1947 (2010) [PMC free article] [PubMed]

12. Christianson J, Leatherman S, Sutherland K. Financial Incentives, Healthcare Providers and Quality Improvements: A Review of the Evidence. London: The Health Foundation; 2007. [Google Scholar]

13. Christianson, J.B., Leatherman, S., Sutherland, K.: Lessons from evaluations of purchaser pay-for-performance programs: a review of the evidence. Med. Care Res. Rev. 65(6 Suppl), 5S–35S (2008) [PubMed]

14. Chung, S., Palaniappan, L., Wong, E., Rubin, H., Luft, H.: Does the frequency of pay-for-performance payment matter? Experience from a randomized trial. Health Serv. Res. 45(2), 553–564 (2009) [PMC free article] [PubMed]

15. Conrad DA, Christianson JB. Penetrating the” black box”: financial incentives for enhancing the quality of physician services. Med. Care Res. Rev. 2004;61(3):37–68. doi: 10.1177/1077558704266770. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

16. Conrad DA, Perry L. Quality-based financial incentives in health care: can we improve quality by paying for it? Annu. Rev. Public Health. 2009;30:357–371. doi: 10.1146/annurev.publhealth.031308.100243. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

17. Damberg, C.L., Sorbero, M.E., Mehrotra, A., Teleki, S.S., Lovejoy, S., Bradley, L.: An environmental scan of pay for performance in the hospital setting: final report. Rand Health working paper WR-474-ASPE/CMS, Rand Health, Santa Monica, CA (2007)

18. Deci EL, Koestner R, Ryan RM. A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychol. Bull. 1999;125:627–668. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

19. Donabedian A. The quality of care: how can it be assessed? J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1988;260(12):1743–1748. doi: 10.1001/jama.1988.03410120089033. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

20. Doran T, Fullwood C, Reeves D, Gravelle H, Roland M. Exclusion of patients from pay-for-performance targets by English Physicians. N. Engl. J. Med. 2008;359(3):274–284. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa0800310. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

21. Doran T, Fullwood C, Kontopantelis E, Reeves D. Effect of financial incentives on inequalities in the delivery of primary clinical care in England: analysis of clinical activity indicators for the quality and outcomes framework. Lancet. 2008;372(9640):728–736. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(08)61123-X. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

22. Doran T, Roland M. Lessons from major initiatives to improve primary care in the United Kingdom. Health Aff. 2010;29(5):1023–1029. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0069. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

23. Dranove D, Kessler D, McClellan M, Satterthwaite M. Is more information better? The effects of “Report Cards” on health care providers. J. Political Econ. 2003;111(3):555–588. doi: 10.1086/374180. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

24. Duckett S, Daniels S, Kamp M, Stockwell A, Walker G, Ward M. Pay for performance in Australia: Queensland’s new clinical practice improvement payment. J. Health Serv. Res. Policy. 2008;13(3):174–177. doi: 10.1258/jhsrp.2008.007178. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

25. Dudley RA, Frolich A, Robinowitz DL, Talavera JA, Broadhead P, Luft HS, McDonald K. Strategies to support quality-based purchasing: a review of the evidence. Technical review 10. 04–0057. Rockville: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2004. [Google Scholar]

26. Dudley RA, Miller RH, Korenbrot TY, Luft HS. The impact of financial incentives on quality of health care. Milbank Q. 1998;76(4):649–686. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.00109. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

27. Eggleston K. Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment. J. Health Econ. 2005;24(1):211–223. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

28. Emmert, M., Eijkenaar, F., Kempter, H., Esslinger, S., Schöffski, O.: Economic evaluation of pay for performance in health care: a systematic review. Forthcoming in the Eur. J. Health Econ. (2011) [PubMed]

29. Enthoven AC, Tollen LA. Competition in health care: It takes systems to pursue quality and efficiency. Health Aff. Web Exclusives. 2005;W5:420–433. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

30. Frederick S, Loewenstein G, O’Donoghue T. Time discounting and time preference: a critical review. J. Econ. Lit. 2002;40(2):351–401. doi: 10.1257/002205102320161311. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

31. Freedman JL, Cunningham JA, Krismer K. Inferred values and the reverse-incentive effect in induced compliance. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1992;62(3):357–368. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.3.357. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

32. Freidson E. Professionalism: the third logic. London: Polity Press; 2001. [Google Scholar]

33. Frey BS. On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivation. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 1997;15(4):427–439. doi: 10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01028-4. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

34. Friedberg MW, Safran DG, Coltin K, Dresser M, Schneider EC. Paying for performance in primary care: potential impact on practices and disparities. Health Aff. 2010;29(5):926–932. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0985. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

35. Frølich A, Talavera JA, Broadhead P, Dudley RA. A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality. Health Policy. 2007;80(1):179–193. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2006.03.001. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

36. Gaynor M, Gertler P. Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships. Rand J. Econ. 1995;26(4):591–613. doi: 10.2307/2556008. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

37. Gaynor M, Rebitzer JB, Taylor LJ. Physician incentives in health maintenance organizations. J. Political Econ. 2004;112(4):915–931. doi: 10.1086/421172. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

38. Gibbons R. Incentives in organizations. J. Econ. Perspect. 1998;12:115–132. doi: 10.1257/jep.12.4.115. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

39. Glickman SW, Ou F, DeLong ER, Roe MT, Lytle BL, Mulgund J, Rumsfeld JS, Gibler WB, Ohman EM, Schulman KA, Peterson ED. Pay for performance, quality of care, and outcomes in acute myocardial infarction. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2007;297(21):2373–2380. doi: 10.1001/jama.297.21.2373. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

40. Gneezy U, Rustichini A. Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Quart. J. Econ. 2000;115(3):791–810. doi: 10.1162/003355300554917. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

41. Gosden, T., Forland, F., Kristiansen, I. S., Sutton, M., Leese, B., Giuffrida, A., Sergison, M., Pedersen, L. :Capitation, salary, fee-for-service and mixed systems of payment: effects on the behaviour of primary care physicians. Cochrane Database Syst. Rev. 3(3) (2000) [PubMed]

42. Gosden, T., Forland, F., Kristiansen, I. S., Sutton, M., Leese, B., Giuffrida, A., Sergison, M., Pedersen, L.: Impact of payment method on behaviour of primary care physicians: a systematic review. J. Health Serv. Res. Policy 6(1), 44–55 (2001) [PubMed]

43. Gravelle H, Sutton M, Ma A. Doctor behaviour under a pay for performance contract: further evidence from the quality and outcomes framework. CHE research paper 34. York: Center for Health Economics; 2008. [Google Scholar]

44. Greenfield S, Kaplan SH, Kahn R, Ninomiya J, Griffith JL. Profiling care provided by different groups of physicians: effects of patient case-mix (bias) and physician-level clustering on quality assessment results. Ann. Intern. Med. 2002;136(2):111–121. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

45. Grol, R.: Successes and failures in the implementation of evidence-based guidelines for clinical practice. Med. Care 39(8 Suppl 2), II46–II54 (2001) [PubMed]

46. Gross R, Elhaynay A, Friedman N, Buetow S. Pay-for-performance programs in Israeli sick funds. J. Health Organ. Manag. 2008;22(1):23–35. doi: 10.1108/14777260810862380. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

47. Grossman SJ, Hart OD. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica. 1983;51:7–45. doi: 10.2307/1912246. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

48. Grumbach K, Osmond D, Vranizan K, Jaffe D, Bindman AB. Primary care physicians’ experience of financial incentives in managed-care systems. N. Engl. J. Med. 1998;339(21):1516–1521. doi: 10.1056/NEJM199811193392106. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

49. Heath C, Larrick RP, Wu G. Goals as reference points. Cogn. Psychol. 1999;38(1):79–109. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1998.0708. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

50. Higgins A, Zeddies T, Pearson SD. Measuring the performance of individual physicians by collecting data from multiple health plans: the results of a two-state test. Health Aff. 2011;30(4):673–681. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0070. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

51. Hillman, A. L., Pauly, M. V., Kerstein, J. J.: How do financial incentives affect physicians' clinical decisions and the financial performance of health maintenance organizations? N. Engl. J. Med. 321(2), 86–92 (1989) [PubMed]

52. Hillman AL, Ripley K, Goldfarb N, Nuamah I, Weiner J, Lusk E. Physician financial incentives and feedback: failure to increase cancer screening in medicaid managed care. Am. J. Public Health. 1998;88(11):1699. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.88.11.1699. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

53. Hillman AL, Ripley K, Goldfarb N, Weiner J, Nuamah I, Lusk E. The use of physician financial incentives and feedback to improve pediatric preventive care in medicaid managed care. Pediatrics. 1999;104(4):931–935. doi: 10.1542/peds.104.4.931. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

54. Hofer TP, Hayward RA, Greenfield S, Wagner EH, Kaplan SH, Manning WG. The unreliability of individual physician “report cards” for assessing the costs and quality of care of a chronic disease. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1999;281(22):2098–2105. doi: 10.1001/jama.281.22.2098. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

55. Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econ. Organ. 1991;7(1):24–52. doi: 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

56. Huang IC, Diette GB, Dominici F, Frangakis C, Wu AW. Variations of physician group profiling indicators for asthma care. Am. J. Manag. Care. 2005;11(1):38–44. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

57. Institute of Medicine . Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning Incentives in Medicare. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press; 2007. [Google Scholar]

58. Institute of Medicine . Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: National University Press; 2001. [Google Scholar]

59. Ittner, C.D., Larcker, D.F.: Determinants of performance measure choices in worker incentive plans. J. Labor Econ. 20(2, Pt. 2), S58–S90 (2002)

60. Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler R. Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market. Am. Econ. Rev. 1986;76(4):728–741. [Google Scholar]

61. Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica. 1979;47(2):263–291. doi: 10.2307/1914185. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

62. Karve AM, Ou FS, Lytle BL, Peterson ED. Potential unintended financial consequences of pay-for-performance on the quality of care for minority patients. Am. Heart J. 2008;155(3):571–576. doi: 10.1016/j.ahj.2007.10.043. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

63. Krein SL, Hofer TP, Kerr EA, Hayward RA. Whom should we profile? Examining diabetes care practice variation among primary care providers, provider groups, and health care facilities. Health Serv. Res. 2002;37(5):1159–1180. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.01102. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

64. Landon BE, Normand SL, Blumenthal D, Daley J. Physician clinical performance assessment: prospects and barriers. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2003;290(9):1183–1189. doi: 10.1001/jama.290.9.1183. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

65. Landon BE, Normand ST. Performance Measurement in the small office practice: challenges and potential solutions. Ann. Intern. Med. 2008;148:353–357. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

66. Lee TT, Cheng SH, Chen CC, Lai MS. A pay-for-performance program for diabetes care in Taiwan: a preliminary assessment. Am. J. Manag. Care. 2010;16(1):65–69. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

67. Marshall M, Harrison S. It’s about more than money: financial incentives and internal motivation. Qual. Saf. Health Care. 2005;14(1):4–5. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.013193. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

68. McDonald R, Roland M. Pay for performance in primary care in England and California: comparison of unintended consequences. Ann. Fam. Med. 2009;7(2):121–127. doi: 10.1370/afm.946. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

69. McDonald R, White J, Marmor TR. Paying for performance in primary medical care: learning about and learning from “success” and “failure” in England and California. J. Health Politics Policy Law. 2009;34(5):747–776. doi: 10.1215/03616878-2009-024. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

70. McGlynn EA, Asch SM, Adams J, Keesey J, Hicks J, DeCristofaro A, Kerr EA. The quality of health care delivered to adults in the United States. N. Engl. J. Med. 2003;348(26):2635–2645. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa022615. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

71. Mehrotra A, Adams JL, Thomas JW, McGlynn EA. Cost profiles: should the focus be on individual physicians or physician groups? Health Aff. 2010;29(8):1532–1538. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2009.1091. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

72. Mehrotra A, Damberg CL, Sorbero ME, Teleki SS. Pay for performance in the hospital setting: What is the state of the evidence? Am. J. Med. Qual. 2009;24(1):19–28. doi: 10.1177/1062860608326634. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

73. Mehrotra A, Sorbero ME, Damberg CL. Using the lessons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-performance programs. Am. J. Manag. Care. 2010;16(7):497–503. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

74. Moore SH, Martin DP, Richardson WC, Riedel DC. Cost containment through risk-sharing by primary care physicians: A history of the development of united healthcare. Health Care Financ. Rev. 1980;1(4):1–13. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

75. Mullen KJ, Frank RG, Rosenthal MB. Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers. RAND J. Econ. 2010;41(1):64–91. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00090.x. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

76. Nyweide DJ, Weeks WB, Gottlieb DJ, Casalino LP, Fisher ES. Relationship of primary care physicians’ patient caseload with measurement of quality and cost performance. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2009;302(22):2444–2450. doi: 10.1001/jama.2009.1810. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

77. Oliver P. Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: theoretical investigations. Am. J. Sociol. 1980;85(6):1356–1375. doi: 10.1086/227168. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

78. Petersen LA, Woodard LD, Urech T, Daw C, Sookanan S. Does pay-for-performance improve the quality of health care? Ann. Intern. Med. 2006;145(4):265–272. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

79. Prendergast C. The provision of incentives in firms. J. Econ. Lit. 1999;37(1):7–63. doi: 10.1257/jel.37.1.7. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

80. Reeves D, Campbell SM, Adams J, Shekelle PG, Kontopantelis E, Roland MO. Combining multiple indicators of clinical quality: an evaluation of different analytic approaches. Med. Care. 2007;45(6):489–496. doi: 10.1097/MLR.0b013e31803bb479. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

81. Rizzo JA, Blumenthal JA. Is the target income hypothesis an economic heresy? Med. Care Res. Rev. 1996;53(3):243–266. doi: 10.1177/107755879605300301. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

82. Rizzo JA, Zeckhauser RJ. Reference incomes, loss aversion, and physician behavior. Rev. Econ. Stat. 2003;85(4):909–922. doi: 10.1162/003465303772815817. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

83. Robinson JC, Williams T, Yanagihara D. Measurement of and reward for efficiency in California’s pay-for-performance program. Health Aff. 2009;28(5):1438–1447. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.28.5.1438. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

84. Rochon, M., Pink, G.H., Brown, A.D., Studer, M.L., Reiter, K.L., Leatt, P., Landon, B.E., Culyer, T., Golden, B.R., Feasby, T.E., Gerdes, C., Halparin, E., Davis, D., Greengarten, M., Hundert, M., Vertesi, L., Hudson, A.R.: HealthcarePapers6(4) (2006)

85. Roland M. Linking physicians’ pay to the quality of care–a major experiment in the United Kingdom. N. Engl. J. Med. 2004;351(14):1448–1454. doi: 10.1056/NEJMhpr041294. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

86. Rosenthal MB, Dudley RA. Pay-for-performance: will the latest payment trend improve care? J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2007;297(7):740–744. doi: 10.1001/jama.297.7.740. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

87. Rosenthal MB, Frank RG. What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health care? Med. Care Res. Rev. 2006;63(2):135–157. doi: 10.1177/1077558705285291. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

88. Rosenthal MB, Landon BE, Howitt K, Song HR, Epstein AM. Climbing up the pay-for-performance learning curve: where are the early adopters now? Health Aff. 2007;26(6):1674–1682. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.26.6.1674. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

89. Rosenthal MB, Landon BE, Normand SL, Frank RG, Epstein AM. Pay for performance in commercial HMOs. N. Engl. J. Med. 2006;355(18):1895–1902. doi: 10.1056/NEJMsa063682. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

90. Scholle SH, Roski J, Adams JL, Dunn DL, Kerr EA, Dugan DP, Jensen RE. Benchmarking physician performance: Reliability of individual and composite measures. Am. J. Manag. Care. 2008;14(12):833–838. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

91. Seddon ME, Marshall MN, Campbell SM, Roland MO. Systematic review of studies of quality of clinical care in general practice in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Qual. Health Care. 2001;10(3):152–158. doi: 10.1136/qhc.0100152. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

92. Shen Y. Selection incentives in a performance-based contracting system. Health Serv. Res. 2003;38(2):535–552. doi: 10.1111/1475-6773.00132. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

93. Sorbero, M.E., Damberg, C.L., Shaw, R., Teleki, S., Lovejoy, S., Decristofaro, A., Dembosky, J., Schuster, C.: Assessment of pay-for-performance options for medicare physician services: final report. RAND health, RAND working paper WR-391-ASPE, Santa Monica, CA (2006)

94. Steel N, Maisey S, Clark A, Fleetcroft R, Howe A. Quality of clinical primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study. Br. J. Gen. Pract. 2007;57:449–454. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

95. Thaler RH. Mental accounting and consumer choice. Market. Sci. 1985;4(3):199–214. doi: 10.1287/mksc.4.3.199. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

96. Thaler RH. Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Econ. Lett. 1981;8(3):201–207. doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

97. Town, R., Wholey, D.R., Kralewski, J., Dowd, B.: Assessing the influence of incentives on physicians and medical groups. Med. Care Res. Rev. 61(3 Suppl), 80S–118S (2004) [PubMed]

98. Van Herck P, De Smedt D, Annemans L, Remmen R, Rosenthal MB, Sermeus W. Systematic review: effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health care. BMC Health Serv. Res. 2010;10(1):247. doi: 10.1186/1472-6963-10-247. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

99. Werner RM, Goldman LE, Dudley RA. Comparison of change in quality of care between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals. J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2008;299(18):2180–2187. doi: 10.1001/jama.299.18.2180. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

100. Weyer SM, Bobiak S, Stange KC. Possible unintended consequences of a focus on performance: insights over time from the research association of practices network. Qual. Manag. Health Care. 2008;17(1):47–52. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2007.023309. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

101. Young GJ, Conrad DA. Practical issues in the design and implementation of pay-for-quality programs. J. Healthc. Manag. 2007;52(1):10–18. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

102. Young GJ, White B, Burgess JF, Jr, Berlowitz D, Meterko M, Guldin MR, Bokhour BG. Conceptual issues in the design and implementation of pay-for-quality programs. Am. J. Med. Qual. 2005;20(3):144–150. doi: 10.1177/1062860605275222. [PubMed] [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

Page 2

The European Journal of Health Economics

Conclusions with respect to P4P-program design