What was one of the first issues as a new president that reagan experienced with the soviet union?

The Geneva Summit, the first meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, was held on November 19 and 20, 1985. The two leaders met to discuss the Cold War-era arms race, primarily the possibility of reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Hosted in Geneva, Switzerland, the meeting was the first American-Soviet summit in more than six years.

The Politburo of the USSR had elected Gorbachev its General Secretary only months earlier, following Konstantin Chernenko’s death in March of 1985. Gorbachev was the youngest member of the Politburo upon assuming the position, and he brought with him a fresh approach to many issues, including nuclear diplomacy.

Up to this point, the Soviet military had focused on preparing to win a hypothetical nuclear war with a massive accumulation of nuclear arms (Rhodes 189). Gorbachev, however, embraced the idea of common security. Common security—a response to the mass destruction that would ensue if nuclear deterrence failed—emerged from the thinking and policies of European leaders such as West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Ostpolitik, which attempted to normalize relations between his country and Eastern Europe.

The principle of common security asserts that “countries can only find security in cooperation with their competitors, not against them” (Palme Commission). For Gorbachev, this meant working with the United States for bilateral reduction of nuclear arms. Historian Richard Rhodes cites Gorbachev’s address to the 27th Congress of USSR’s Communist Party as an example. Gorbachev contended that “genuine equal security is guaranteed not by the highest possible, but by the lowest possible level of strategic balance, from which it is essential to exclude entirely nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction” (192).

Like Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan also rejected previous Cold War foreign policy norms. He rebuked the politics of détente that had characterized relations between the two superpowers in the 1970s. To Reagan, détente implied that the Soviet Union “had earned geopolitical, ideological, economic, and moral legitimacy as an equal to the United States” (Gaddis 225). Reagan opposed this stance on account of the USSR’s undemocratic system and totalitarian tendencies, famously referring to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” in 1983.

Reagan also disavowed the long-entrenched concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction held that—for two sides with large nuclear stockpiles—if one side launched a first strike on the other, the other side would retaliate. The resulting nuclear war would totally annihilate both sides. Knowing this, both sides would be deterred from launching a first nuclear strike.

Mutually Assured Destruction implied that it would be dangerous for a nuclear power to construct defenses against enemy nuclear weapons, as the defensively equipped state could then launch a first strike without needing to fear retaliation. Reagan, however, dismissed the idea that “vulnerability could provide security,” and championed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), hoping to render nuclear weapons obsolete (Gaddis 226). Nuclear arms useless against this hypothetical defense system, disarmament could commence. In March 1983, Reagan posed the following question in a televised address:

“What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our Allies?” (“Defense and National Security”)

The new program—quickly dubbed “Star Wars” by the media for its possible use of satellite weapons—triggered Soviet anxieties. George P. Shultz, Reagan’s Secretary of State, wrote, “SDI proved to be of deep concern to the Soviets…The Soviets were genuinely alarmed by the prospect of American science ‘turned on’ and venturing into the realm of space defenses” (Shultz 264).

Thus, both the United States and the USSR had come to share the goal of nuclear arms reduction by 1985, despite differences in how they thought it should be carried out. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that they would meet in November of 1985 in Geneva to discuss nuclear arms reduction and other issues of international diplomacy, including human rights.

At Geneva, the two men quickly developed a rapport, even as they debated—sometimes quite ferociously—international issues of such grave importance. Gorbachev left a good impression on Reagan, who described the Soviet Secretary General as having “warmth in his face and style, not the coldness bordering on hatred I’d seen in most other senior Soviet leaders I’d met until then” (Gaddis 229).

The first meeting of the two leaders, alone except for translators, took place the morning of November 19. In preliminary remarks, both men expressed a hope for future cooperation and peace but also sparred over the USSR’s involvement in socialist movements around the world (Rhodes 195).

Reagan and Gorbachev joined their delegations for the first plenary session. Gorbachev opened by again declaiming the importance of cooperation and common security among the states going forward. Reagan countered, arguing that the USSR had not given the United States much reason to trust them, with its rhetoric of a “one-world Communist State,” and continued military buildup. On the other hand, he did say that the US was “ready to try to meet Soviet concerns if they were ready to reciprocate” (Rhodes 198).

Reagan then brought up SDI, proposing that the United States and USSR share a defensive system with the other if either were to develop it. Reagan denied allegations that the US was seeking to gain a first-strike advantage, and he argued that SDI could shield the two states from a hypothetical rogue third party with nuclear weapons.

After breaking for lunch, Gorbachev repudiated Reagan’s claim of the Soviet Union as an expansionist “evil empire” before voicing his fears that the development of SDI could lead to an arms race in space. Gorbachev stated as his goal continued strategic parity for the two states, “equal security at lower levels of force,” something which SDI would undermine (Rhodes 202). As such, Gorbachev offered to negotiate on offensive weapons reduction if and only if Reagan abandoned SDI.

Reagan refused on the grounds that SDI technology should not be considered a “space weapon”—merely a defense—and reiterated his offer to share the technology with the Soviets should the United States develop it. Gorbachev did not take the offer seriously. At this point, they had reached a stalemate that continued throughout the next day of negotiations as well.

Despite the lack of tangible progress on specific nuclear arms measures, the Geneva Summit was a breakthrough point for American-Soviet relations. This breakthrough was largely predicated on the personal connection forged between Gorbachev and Reagan. Shultz wrote that between the two men at the final ceremony, “The personal chemistry was apparent. The easy and relaxed attitude toward each other, the smiles, the sense of purpose, all showed through” (606). This attitude, coupled with the shared, ultimately peaceful goal of nuclear arms reduction, allowed for the creation of a joint statement expressing support for this principle. The two men had laid the groundwork for continued cooperation and negotiation in the years to come.

Reagan and Gorbachev next met the following year at the Reykjavík Summit. 

"Reagan had the imagination to see beyond the ubiquitous Cold War stereotypes that seemed to be set in stone," said Suzanne Massie, author and consultant. At a 1 December 2008 lecture at the Kennan Institute, Massie described her 22 meetings with Ronald Reagan during his presidency.

Massie's first meeting with President Reagan occurred after a particularly memorable visit she made to the Soviet Union in the fall of 1983. One high-ranking Soviet official she talked to during her visit pounded his desk and warned ominously "You don't know how close war is." Massie took his warning seriously and determinedly decided to speak to President Reagan upon her return to the United States. First she met with National Security Advisor Robert MacFarlane and suggested that it might be possible to resume cultural exchange talks with the Soviet Union, and after several meetings, she offered "send me – I can talk to them." The White House sent Massie on a 10-day secret mission in January 1984 to explore this possibility. Before leaving she met with President Reagan for the first time, in the Oval Office. Upon her return in February 1984, Massie reported to him on the successful results of her trip. Over the next four years Massie met with Reagan twenty more times. These personal interactions enabled Massie to trace changes in Reagan's views of Russians.

Reagan was more interested in what the Russian people thought, and why, than what the Kremlin thought. This inquisitiveness distinguished him from most political figures with whom Massie had talked. Massie's descriptions of the many Russians who had welcomed her into their lives engaged the president's interest. Most importantly, in Massie's opinion, she demonstrated to Reagan that the Russian people were not a "monolith marching in lock-step toward a glorious Communist future, but a people of vast contrasts and contradictions."

One of the topics they often discussed was religion. Massie taught Reagan about the historic role and lasting power of Russian Orthodoxy over the lives and mentality of Russians. Reagan was deeply, though discreetly, religious, and learning that the Soviet Union was not completely atheistic made an impression on him. Reagan quickly noticed how much Mikhail Gorbachev himself talked about God. A second topic that Reagan focused on was that of Soviet women. At a meeting of Soviet specialists before Reagan's first trip to Moscow in 1988, Massie suggested that he speak about the importance of Soviet women, pointing out that since they comprised 51 percent of the population, perestroika could not succeed without them. Reagan agreed with her, and his remarks about women during his visits to Russia resonated with the population.

In general, Massie did not interrogate Reagan about his positions, but after 18 meetings, just before his meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, she once asked him "What do you want from the Russians, anyway?" Without hesitation Reagan answered firmly "I want to get rid of those atomic weapons, every one." This was the point at which Massie taught Reagan the famous Russian proverb that translates as "trust, but verify," a phrase that he subsequently used on numerous occasions.

In concluding her talk, Massie demonstrated Reagan's relevance today for U.S. policy toward Russia and gave some words of advice to current policymakers. First, Massie said, Reagan respected Gorbachev and treated him as an equal. Gorbachev appreciated this, and for the first time Reagan was able to create an atmosphere of trust between a U.S. president and a leader of the Soviet Union. Respect is of greatest importance to Russians today and can help to foster trust, if not always agreement. President Medvedev recently addressed this important issue, saying in his remarks at the Foreign Policy Association that "today there is no trust between the United States and Russia." Second, according to Massie, Reagan kept an open mind without giving up his principles or the national interests of the U.S. He did not let Cold War stereotypes dominate his thinking, contrary to how many officials in Washington do today, Massie added. Reagan had the courage to seek knowledge outside of the policy views that some of his advisors promoted. Third, while adamantly opposed to the Communist regime, Reagan recognized the positive contributions the Russian people had made to the world and understood that they faced many problems and had their own national interests.

When Reagan's presidency ended, he left America's relationship with Russia much better than it had been before him, Massie stated. Russia was one of the most pro-American countries in the world in the early 1990s, but today it has become increasingly anti-American at all levels of society. Massie called for the U.S. to recognize, as Reagan did, that the two countries need each other. Russia today is a different country than it was during the Cold War, and policymakers and the new U.S. president need to cast off outmoded models and rhetoric and forge a new policy that takes new realities into consideration.