What is one of the major outcomes of interlocking directorates or linkages among corporations created by individuals who sit on two or more corporate boards?

Abstract

This article focuses on the structural aspects of interlocking directorate networks within and among fifteen European countries. The results show large quantitative differences in network densities within countries. These differences are strongly and significantly related to the ‘variety of capitalism’ in place. Second, an analysis of the interlocking directorates across country borders reveals a European interlocking directorate network in which different countries take quite different positions. As it turns out, a country's international position is strongly and significantly related to its EU membership duration. Additionally, there are indications of a link between the structure of the interlocking directorate network within a country and how that country is positioned in the international network. Data were collected in 2006 concerning 362 corporations with 6115 board positions in fifteen European countries.

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