What were some of the factions that argued against the american annexation of the philippines?

When the United Sates foreign policy finally moved away from its isolationist stance and pursued a more aggressive political outlook, the Spanish-American war offered a springboard for its giant leap towards expansionism. Strategically located in the Far East, the Philippines happened to be at the right place at the right time because it dovetailed with the American geopolitical strategy necessary in achieving the status of a New World power. The Philippines, gateway to the rich markets of China was conveniently, a colony of the Old World empire that was Spain.
As early as 1823, the political climate in the Americas was changing. The power and influence of the Old World particularly Spain, was waning as her Latin American colonies were asserting their rights to independence. Concerned with the intervention of European countries; President James Monroe, in his State of the Union address to the 18th U.S. Congress on December 2, 1823 issued the “Monroe doctrine” which stated that further efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would not be accepted by his government; an assertion that the Western Hemisphere was the United States’ sphere of influence. This doctrine would later be invoked repeatedly and become a major part of U.S. foreign policy for almost two centuries.
In 1845, U.S. President James K. Polk announced to congress that its principles should be strictly enforced and expansion to the West should be aggressively pursued. In the same year, John O’Sullivan, an American journalist and supporter of Polk’s Democratic Party used the term “Manifest Destiny” in an essay “Annexation.” Originally referring to the controversial admission of Texas to the American union, he wrote that it was the manifest destiny or pre-ordained mission of the U.S. to expand to their entire (God) Providence-given continent. He again used it in his column that tackled U.S. dispute with Great Britain over Oregon which appeared in the same year in New York Morning News, this time adding that such manifest destiny was for the development of their great experiment of liberty (style of democracy) and federated self-government. Polk later led U.S. victory in the Mexican-American war over the annexation of Texas, and also in the purchase of other states. Sullivan’s idea of Manifest Destiny did not necessarily include the use of force but in practice, it later promoted white superiority and was mainly responsible not only for the white men’s drive to the West, but also the displacement by brutal force of the American Indians and the conquest of a great part of Mexico. In 1895, the term was heard again when the U.S. intervened in Cuba and later expanded to the Pacific, taking Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines.
Earlier U.S. foreign policy was also influenced by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan who in 1890 wrote “The Influence of Sea Power upon History.” Mahan believed in projecting strength through a strong navy; citing the role of the British Royal Navy in elevating Britain to the status of world power. He suggested the taking of the Caribbean Islands, Hawaii and the Philippines so that they might provide bases to protect U.S. commerce.
            Theodore Roosevelt was an adherent of Mahan’s ideas and a key figure in American expansionism.   As Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1897-1898), he was responsible for the establishment of the U.S. Asiatic Naval Squadron in the British colony of Hong Kong. This was a strategic move because Germany was showing keen interest in the Far East and had established a naval base in Tsingtao, Shantung China in 1897. It was a bold move that gave notice to the world of the entry of the United States into the changing geopolitical arena where Germany was becoming increasingly an   aggressive player. It was also a preparation for the permanent location of bases in the Philippines; an important requisite of naval superiority.
The Asiatic Naval Squadron immediately punctuated its presence by a surprise attack against the Spanish armada on May 1, 1898 at Manila Bay. Thus, although the U.S. declared war with Spain in defense of Cuba, fighting actually began in the Philippines.
It was a decisive naval victory but Dewey arrived without sufficient ground troops to carry the war into the city. It was reported that it was Roosevelt, not Navy Secretary John D. Long who gave the order with approval from Pres. McKinley, but why the surprise attack was not explained. Both knew that the federally controlled regular army consisted only of 28, 183 men at that time; that the National Guards or state militias were under the control of state governors and were prohibited by the U.S. constitution from being deployed overseas. In other words, the U.S. was unprepared for ground warfare when the war started. It was only on April 23 or after U.S. Congress had declared a state of war did McKinley call for the recruitment of 125, 000 volunteers. Significantly it was about at this time according to General Aguinaldo, that U.S. consuls E. Spencer Pratt and Rounsevelle Wildman were talking to him in Singapore. It was inconceivable that these diplomats would initiate the talks without clearance from Washington; but Pratt would later deny any “dealings of a political character,” calling his talks an interview and denying also any statements that could be construed as “showing positive connection” with Aguinaldo.
            The premise for deniability seemed to have been carefully laid down when, as Aguinaldo recalled, Consul Pratt told him of the assurance of Commodore George Dewey, (not President McKinley), that the U.S. would at least recognize Philippine independence; and that there was no need for a written agreement because the word of a U.S. consul and an “Admiral” were solemn pledges that would be fulfilled to the letter.    The impression of all-out support was heightened when Consul Wildman agreed to purchase arms and ammunitions for the revolution.
            By these twin acts, any desperate move by Spanish authorities to grant substantial concessions that could persuade Aguinaldo to fight on their side or at least to stay out, was preempted; but more importantly and perhaps, the real reason for trying to win the trust of Aguinaldo was: sending him home to resume the revolution would keep the Spanish forces busy until sufficient American troops could arrive to take over and play the role of liberators.
If this were true however, the American strategists fully underestimated Aguinaldo and the Filipino revolutionary leaders.   They did not reckon that the whole country would rally behind Aguinaldo; that they could defeat the finest of Spanish Generals, and that within a very short period, could establish a functioning government. The decision to take possession of the country was made two days after Philippine independence was proclaimed. McKinley, by making no concessions and clinging tenaciously to his desire to annex the country, would plunge the U.S. into a long war of attrition. General Arthur Mac Arthur would later confide to a reporter, Irving Hannock in 1899: “When I first started in against these rebels, I believed that Aguinaldo’s troops represented only a faction. I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon — the native population that is — was opposed to us and our offers of aid and good government. But after having come this far, after having occupied several towns and cities in succession, and having been brought much into contact with both insurrectos and amigos, I have been reluctantly compelled to believe that the Filipino masses are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he heads.”
The Spanish-American war was fought for only three months. As early as July 18, 1898, after the fall of Cuba, the Spanish government through French Ambassador to the U.S. Jules Cambon signified to President McKinley the suspension of hostilities to pave the way towards negotiations. McKinley and his cabinet replied with their counter proposals also through Ambassador Cambon, on July 30.
            By August 2, Spain had accepted the U.S. counter proposals with reservations regarding the issue about the Philippines. On August 7, Aguinaldo instructed Felipe Agoncillo, his emissary to McKinley to publish in Hong Kong papers the “Act of Proclamation” (of independence) and the “Manifesto to Foreign Governments”.
            Meanwhile, three U.S. expeditionary forces had started assembling in Manila; the first arriving on June 30, the second on July 17 and the third on July 31. Since the Spanish government had accepted U.S. counterproposals for ceasefire on August 2, it would then appear that both Spain and the U.S. had plenty of time to advise their armies against any aggressive moves that could jeopardize the incoming peace talks. If they had done so, there would not have been a secret negotiation between the protagonists in Manila.
The Spanish Governor-General Fermin Jaudenes could not accept defeat in the hands of the Filipinos.   His option was to surrender to the Americans, but pride dictated that it should be done with honor. To save face and to please the Madrid government, through Belgian consul Edouard Andre, he entered into a secret agreement with Commodore Dewey and General Merritt to stage a mock battle before final surrender was to be consummated. General Jaudenes demanded that Filipinos should not be allowed to participate in the surrender negotiations. By August 12, the eve of the “battle”, a final script had been carefully detailed which included targets of bombardment, troop dispositions, places of skirmishes and secret surrender signals.
            Also on August 12, 1898, the Peace Protocol was signed, paving the way for formal peace settlement. At this time, the entire Luzon was in the hands of Filipino forces and Manila was under siege. Revolutionary leaders were planning for a post-revolution period and a congress was being formed.
            A cable from Washington regarding the Peace protocol would have reached the Philippines had not Commodore George Dewey   cut the only telegraph cable linking Manila to the world after the battle of Manila Bay. Dewey and Merritt could have been advised of the progress of the peace settlement, even before it was signed. It was difficult to comprehend how such a vital necessity was left unserviceable for three months but this was said to be the reason why the sham “capture” of Manila proceeded as planned on August 13; notwithstanding the fact that Spain had accepted the U.S. counter proposals for ceasefire as early as August 2.
            On the other hand, the staged “battle” served to justify the formidable expeditionary forces for the Philippine campaign. It was a show of force and superiority: a psychological blow that disadvantaged the Filipino revolutionists especially when they were left out of the final surrender negotiations. This unexpected development also proved to be a great hindrance to Felipe Agoncillo who tried to represent the country but was not allowed into the peace negotiations in Paris.
The scenario would have been different if the besieged city of Manila surrendered to the Filipinos. There would have been no reason for prolonged U.S. presence and the eventual souring of Filipino-American relations. The Americans would have been also hard put to do anything but watch the establishment of the first republican government in Asia. Indeed, the reorganization of local and national governments, the establishment of schools, a university, a military Academy; the national budget and the Malolos Congress demonstrated the Filipinos’ capacity for self governance. Filipino leaders proved that they could nurture the gains of the revolution and accomplish peacefully, democratically, and lawfully, what were expected of them in a civilized society. The justification that the American occupation meant to civilize and teach democracy and government to Filipinos was therefore misinformed, absurd, downright presumptuous and insulting.             The “victory” of the Americans in Manila was a political coup undoubtedly used as leverage in the Paris peace negotiations. The tragedy was, because of the total lack of knowledge of the history, cultural diversity and aspirations of the Filipino people, the resulting American occupation was marked with racism and savagery reminiscent of the brutality of the U.S.-Indian wars.

Philippine independence was doomed when the McKinley administration decided to occupy the Philippines. General Jaudenes’ demand served only to solidify this decision. Dewey was ordered by the Department of the Navy to distance himself from General Aguinaldo to avoid any commitments. He later said that he never considered Aguinaldo an ally. To keep the Filipino forces from attacking the city was, in his own words, his greatest concern while waiting for the arrival of the Eight Army Corps reinforcements. He referred to Filipinos as "the Indians" and promised Washington, D.C. that he would "enter the city and keep the Indians out."

            This example of racist opinion of the Filipinos played a major role in the conduct of the American war with the Philippines. With few exceptions, American officers and soldiers came with a mantle of white supremacy on their shoulders; not surprisingly because many generals were veterans of the Indian wars. With a flawed view of the on-going war, the army also recruited wild game hunters and cowboys. The American press, equally in the dark about the Philippines relied mainly on the dispatches of the U.S. War department and U.S. propaganda which downgraded the Philippine-American war into an insurrection, branding Philippine President Emilio Aguinaldo a rebel and his belligerent generals, brigands or bandits. General Otis would later censor letters from U.S. soldiers and first hand accounts of reporters. He would also prevent the International Red Cross, invited into the country by Aguinaldo to observe the war. Although Malolos congress president Pedro Paterno issued a proclamation of war on June 2, 1899, none was issued by the U.S. government.
   Granted that the U.S. forces, ruse and treachery notwithstanding, had something to prove in capturing Manila, the Spanish jurists and peace commissioners were technically correct in asserting that it was invalid because it happened after the armistice.    And, although cession of the Philippines was won in the succeeding Treaty of Paris, the actuations of President McKinley, in his rush to annex the Philippines raised legal issues. He issued his proclamation, “Benevolent Assimilation” on December 21, 1898, declaring sovereignty over the archipelago, even before the treaty was ratified by U.S. congress. By international law, because the treaty was not yet ratified, the right or authority to its implementation did not yet exist. To occupy the country and enforce submission with the use of force was an act of aggression. Technically, President McKinley declared war with the Philippines without congressional approval and even before the first shot was heard in Santa Mesa. Accordingly, this indiscretion placed him in a terrible pressure to have the Treaty of Paris ratified at all costs. While U.S. Congress was scheduled to vote on it on February 6, oppositionists threatened to block its passage or at least force a tie. Amazingly, on February 4, fighting erupted in Manila; immediately followed the next day by an all-out attack by U.S. troops. Buencamino’s report to Aguinaldo and the actions taken by both Generals Arthur Mac Arthur and Elwell Otis were too discomforting to dispel the suspicion that the events were not merely coincidental.
The U.S. had about 20,000 men in the Philippines when the war started. This figure ballooned to about 74,000 by 1900 and to more than 126,000 by war’s end. Accounts of U.S. casualties vary but the wounded were reported to be about 2,000 and deaths about 4,234—4,390 soldiers and officers, including Colonel John M. Stotsenberg and General Henry W. Lawton. (Lawton was the legendary Indian war fighter who captured the equally fabled Indian chief Geronimo but who, by a strange twist of fate, was killed in action in an encounter with Filipino General [Licerio] Geronimo in San Mateo in 1899.)
The war was declared over by President Theodore Roosevelt after three years on July 4, 1902, but would actually drag on for more than a decade of guerrilla warfare. The financial cost to the U.S. was about 600 million dollars— a vast fortune compared to the 20 million dollars paid for the cession of the Philippines.
            The damage done to the Philippines was irreparable. More than an estimated 250,000 Filipino lives were lost, about 20,000 of them soldiers. Many were shot instead of being taken as prisoners of war; hundreds of suspected and genuine guerilla fighters were labeled common bandits; hunted, tortured and hanged without the benefit of a trial especially, during the so called “pacification campaign”. Houses were looted for war bounties; women raped. Civilians were forcibly displaced; and died of diseases, starvation and overcrowding in concentration camps. Thousands also died as a result of immediate retribution over the loss of American lives; most infamous of which was the incident in Samar where an American officer, General Jacob “Hellfire Jake” Smith ordered the wanton burning of villages and massacre of men over the age of ten. A U.S. General, William Shafter, who was not even in the Philippines remarked that it might even be necessary to kill half the Filipino population before “perfect justice” could be granted to the other half. And, on May 30, 1902, it was reported that U.S. President Roosevelt, speaking before the Memorial Day crowd gathered at Arlington Cemetery, defended his army from the charges of atrocities by saying that the Philippine-American conflict was being fought between the forces of “civilization” and “savagery”; adding the racist remark that the Filipinos were “Chinese half-breeds” and insisting that the war was the most “glorious” in their nation’s history.
            The most irreparable damage was in the self-respect, values, traditions, cultural heritage and aspirations of a people who, after celebrating the birth of their nation under a lawfully constituted republic suffered the tragedy of its death and found themselves paying obeisance to a foreign master once again.

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"AND, AFTER ALL, THE PHILIPPINES ARE ONLY THE STEPPING-STONE TO CHINA,”
Cartoon published in Judge Magazine, ca 1900 or1902 depicts Uncle Sam using the Philippines as stepping stone to gain access across the Pacific to China.

Author of the "Monroe Doctrine" James Monroe, fifth president of the United States

James K. Polk, eleventh president of the United States. His aggressive foreign policy based on the principles of the Monroe Doctrine gave birth to the term "Manifest Destiny".

The New York World reports the defeat of the Spanish armada in the battle of Manila Bay. By this victory, Commodore George Dewey, was promoted to Rear Admiral by mid May. In March 1899, U.S. Congress appointed him Admiral.

U.S. Consul to Singapore E. Spencer Pratt and Consul to Hongkong Rounsevelle Wildman

"The eyes of the world are upon him."
Political cartoon printed in the Minneapolis Tribune shows U.S. president McKinley trying to decide what to do to the Philippines depicted as a savage child. The issue was whether to return the country to Spain (hurl it back to the cliff) or to keep it. Independence was not an option.

General Arthur Mac Arthur ordered the American troops to advance against the Filipino lines on February 5, a day after the fatal shooting of a Filipino corporal by an American sentry. This triggered the all-out Philippine-American war.

Signing of the Peace Protocol
U.S. president McKinley (standing center) watches William R. Day, U.S. Secretary of State signing the Peace Protocol. Jules Cambon, ambassador of France and representing Spain is seated at the left.

American Flags adorn the Ayuntamiento, seat of Spanish colonial government in Manila.

1899 Political cartoon by Joseph Morewood Staniforth. Uncle Sam (Jonathan) carries a whip and rebukes a man (the Philippines) who carries a sack marked “American Sovereignty”.

CHANGING THE LOAD
Jonathan: “You ungrateful skunk! After me knocking off that Spanish burden for you I guess you ought to be proud and thankful to carry mine.”

Major General Elwell Otis
After the initial skirmishes, General Aguinaldo, wishing to prevent further escalation of hostilities sent an emissary, General Carlos Mario de la Torre to Major General Elwell S. Otis to propose peace talks and a demilitarized zone. Otis’ terse reply was, “fighting having begun, must go on to the grim end.”

The sudden all-out attack by the Americans on February 5, 1899 surprised Filipino soldiers who died in their trenches. Aside from torture and re-concentration of entire barrios, the occupation forces also employed public execution by gallows in their so-called "pacification campaign".

"ONLY SOLUTION IN SAMAR"
The Washington Post December 24, 1901
The dialog on the cartoon is attributed to U.S. Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, commander of the Military Department of the Visayas and responsible for Samar. On September 28, 1901, a detachment of U.S. troops was ambushed by Filipinos in Balangiga, Samar. In retaliation, General Jacob Smith ordered the burning of the villages and killing of everyone over ten years old.
With no knowledge of the Philippines and its people, Filipinos were often depicted as small, uncivilized savages with unkempt hair and wearing straws.

"KILL EVERY ONE OVER TEN"
The New York Evening Journal, May 5, 1902
Cartoon depicting the infamous order of General Jacob Smith in Balangiga, Samar. Instead of the bald eagle, a vulture perches atop the American shield draped in American flags.
Caption at the bottom reads: "Criminals Because They Were Born Ten Years Before We Took the Philippines"